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Large asset managers like BlackRock and Vanguard have amassed staggering
equity holdings. The voting rights that accompany these holdings give them enormous power
over many of the world’s largest companies. This unprecedented concentration of influence
in a small group of financial intermediaries is a pressing policy concern. While law and
finance literature on the topic has recently exploded, no one has offered a satisfying theory
to explain their voting behavior. Existing work tries to understand their approach to
voting in conventional terms—as an attempt to improve the performance of portfolio
firms—but this is not why large asset managers vote the way they do.
In contrast, this Article offers a political theory of asset-manager voting. Because
of the power they wield, and the high stakes involved, large asset managers risk severe
political blowback from looking like reluctant participants in corporate governance and
from voting counter to the views of powerful politicians. As a result, politics rather than
finance drives their decisions.
Politically motivated asset-manager voting is problematic. It leads to market
uncertainty and threatens the core division between business and government. It is also an
illegitimate use of the voting power that asset managers are duty-bound to exercise on behalf
of the shareholders in the funds that they oversee. But voting authority is a privilege not a
right. To draw politics out of corporate governance, regulators should require that asset
managers seek input from fund shareholders and reflect that input in their votes.
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INTRODUCTION
A small group of asset managers have accumulated unrivaled wealth
and power.1 Industry leaders, like BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street (the
Big 3”), have compiled massive equity holdings in public companies through
the mutual funds and exchange traded funds (“ETFs”) that they oversee.2
See John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of The Twelve 13-14
(Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 19-07, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp
-content/uploads/2019/11/John-Coates.pdf (BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street
collectively control “a much greater share of U.S. public companies than any three single
investors have ever previously done.”); Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Commissioner, Sec. & Exch.
Comm., Testimony Before the Federal Trade Commission Hearing on Competition and
Consumer Protection, Common Ownership: The Investor Protection Challenge of the 21st
Century 7 (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/jackson-testimony-ftc120618 (referring to the concentration of power in the biggest asset managers as
“unprecedented”).
2 See Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of
Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 313 (2017) (finding that the
1
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The voting rights that come with these holdings give them enormous clout.3
For example, in May 2021, the Big 3 supported an improbable challenge to
the oil giant Exxon from a little-known hedge fund, Engine Company
Number 1.4 They backed three directors for Exxon’s board, all of whom
were nominated because they planned, if elected, to press the company to
change its focus to renewable energy.5 Thanks to the Big 3’s support, the
provocateurs won.6 Their election illustrates that leading asset managers
have power over the biggest and most fundamental questions of firm
strategy and mission at the biggest companies in the world. There is perhaps
no greater change than shifting Exxon from its focus on oil. A few months
after the electoral rebuke, Exxon, once “unrepentant in its defense of
crude,”7 announced that it was considering the previously unthinkable—a
carbon-neutral pledge.8
Because the large asset managers wield such tremendous power,
understanding why they vote the way they do is the most important question
in corporate governance. Why did the Big 3 choose to shake up Exxon
rather than support the status quo? A wave of recent scholarship has studied
asset-manager voting through a conventional law-and-economics lens.
These scholars have focused on whether industry leaders are using their
voting power to improve the performance of portfolio firms.9 The literature
Big 3 are, collectively, the largest shareholder in 88% of S&P 500 companies, and that the
remaining firms are typically dominated by founders, family members, or other insiders);
Dawn Lim & Justin Baer, BlackRock, Other Investors Target Climate Issues, Covid-19 Response and
Board Seats in Shareholder Votes, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
blackrock-other-investors-wield-growing-board-shareholder-vote-clout-11628766001
(reporting that the Big 3 collectively own nearly 20% of equity in S&P 500 companies).
3 See infra Part I.B.
4 See Matt Phillips, Exxon Defeat Signals the Rise of Social-Good Activists, N.Y. TIMES (June 9,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/09/business/exxon-mobil-engine-no1-activ
ist.html.
5 See id.
6 See id.
7 ExxonMobil Loses a Proxy Fight with Green Investors, ECONOMIST (May 29, 2021),
https://www.economist.com/business/2021/05/23/what-a-proxy-fight-at-exxonmobilsays-about-big-oil-and-climate-change.
8 Christopher M. Matthews & Emily Glazer, Exxon Considers Pledging ‘Net Zero’ Carbon by
2050, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/exxon-considerspledging-net-zero-carbon-by-2050-11628161201?mod=hp_lead_pos1.
9 Professor Bebchuk and Hirst have authored a trio of articles (along with Professor Cohen,
who coauthored the first article) arguing that the Big 3 fail to adequately police management
of portfolio companies. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The
Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 95 (2017); Lucian Bebchuk & Scott
Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM.
L. REV. 2029 (2019) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Hirst, Future of Corporate Governance]; Lucian
Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Power of the Big Three and Why it Matters (2021)
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reveals that the large asset managers have little economic incentive to do so,
but it fails to provide a plausible alternative account of their motives. In this
Article, I look beyond the conventional economic incentives. Instead, I
show that politics largely motivates voting at the largest managers—and that
this is problematic.
The concentration of equity ownership in a small group of financial
institutions has transformed U.S. equity markets. Historically, individual
investors drove U.S. markets. Millions of individuals held stock directly in
public companies, and none had anything approaching a controlling
interest.10 The assumption of dispersed ownership formed the basis of the
Berle-Means thesis.11 In its modern incarnation, this theory posits that
dispersed ownership causes a collective-action problem: shareholders bear
all of the costs of overseeing corporate managers, but enjoy only a sliver of
the gains if their oversight leads to performance improvements.12 As a result,
shareholders ignore oversight and leave corporate leaders with a great deal
of discretion over how they run their firms, discretion that allows for
mismanagement and abuse.13 Overcoming the problems that stem from this
separation of ownership from control, so-called “agency costs,” has long
been considered the principal problem in corporate governance.14
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Hirst, The Power
of the Big 3]. Others challenge this analysis. See Jill Fisch et al., The New Titans of Wall Street,
A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 PENN. L. REV. 17, 31-37 (2019) (arguing that
the Big 3 have competitive incentives to police corporate management); Marcel Kahan &
Edward B. Rock, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let Shareholders Be Shareholders, 100
B.U. L. REV. 1771, 1796-97 (2020) (arguing that the Big 3 have sufficient economic
incentives to police corporate managers); Jeff Schwartz, ‘Public’ Mutual Funds in THE
HANDBOOK ON INVESTOR PROTECTION 57-64 (Arthur Laby ed., 2021) (critiquing
Bebchuk and Hirst’s analysis); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency
Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 863, 867 (2013) (arguing that index funds act as efficient intermediaries between
activists and corporate management). BlackRock executives have also defended their voting
practices. See generally Barbara Novick, “The Goldilocks Dilemma” A Response to Lucian Bebchuk
and Scott Hirst, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 80 (2020); Matthew Mallow, Asset Management, Index
Funds, and Theories of Corporate Control (Working Paper, Nov. 15, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3483573.
10 See Kristian Rydqvist et al., The Evolution of Aggregate Stock Ownership: A Unified Explanation
8 at tbl. 1 (CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7356, 2009), https://www.ifk-cfs.de/fileadmin
/downloads/events/conferences/2011-07-01-Rydqvist_et_al.pdf (showing that, in 1945,
individuals directly owned 93% of public-company shares).
11 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 86-87 (1932).
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 Professors Jenson and Meckling first used “agency costs” to describe the losses that result
from the separation of ownership from control. See Michael C. Jensen & William H.
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The existing scholarship on asset-manager influence seeks to
understand their voting from within this tradition. At first blush, it seems
that replacing dispersed individual investors with a small group of
sophisticated institutions should greatly ameliorate agency-cost concerns.
The literature shows, however, that the large asset managers face a complex
mix of financial incentives. And scholars are divided on how this affects
agency costs. One camp argues that these financial institutions adequately
police corporate managers;15 others argue that they fall far short.16 The
disagreement centers on whether asset managers earn enough money from
improving their portfolio firms to invest in careful oversight.17
This debate is useful and important, but not in the way the
participating authors imagine. Those who argue that asset managers have
little financial incentive to improve firms in their portfolios have the better
argument, but this insight begins the analysis rather than completes it.
Stepping outside the agency-cost framework reveals a profound implication:
Since engaged voting is unprofitable, something else is dictating how asset
managers vote. This is unprecedented. A group of hugely powerful financial
institutions control corporate America, but they are not using their power to
improve the firms they own.
The lack of a purely financial motivation creates the vacuum that
politics fills. Since voting offers little prospect of direct profits, it makes
sense for asset managers to use their influence to serve their political
interests. It is well-known and understood that companies try to influence
regulators and politicians through lobbying and other forms of direct
political engagement, like financially backing certain candidates.18
Underexplored is how they influence politics through their actions. Acting
in a way that regulators and politicians have signaled that they prefer reduces
the risk of regulatory action and increases the chances of regulatory
forbearance. And large asset managers have much to fear.
The Big 3 and others face more regulatory and political uncertainty
now than at any time since the New Deal.19 An array of journalists,
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
15 See Fisch et al., supra note 9, at 55-56; Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1814-15.
16 See Bebchuk & Hirst, Future of Corporate Governance, supra note 9, at 2035; Dorothy S. Lund,
The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 496-97 (2018) (“[P]assive fund
managers are not doing enough to push management to maximize shareholder welfare”).
17 Compare Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Future of Corporate Governance, supra note 9, at 2033-2075
(presenting a theory for why stewardship is unprofitable) with Fisch et al., supra note 9, at
27-43 (presenting a theory for why stewardship is profitable).
18 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (holding that
corporations may make unlimited independent political expenditures).
19 See infra Part III.A.2.
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politicians, and academics worry that they are destabilizing equity markets,20
suppressing competition in major industries,21 and failing to act as
responsible stewards on behalf of their funds’ shareholders.22 NPR asked, Is
Your Retirement Fund Ruining Our Economy?23 The Atlantic echoed, Could Index
Funds Be Worse than Marxism?.24
A bit hyperbolic, but this agita has generated a slew of reform
proposals. Influential scholars even suggest breaking up the Big 3.25 All of
this makes it likely that the large asset managers view voting as a way to
reduce the political heat. Their institutional history further supports this
conclusion. They are an industry born of regulation, one which views itself
as a partner with regulators, and carefully cultivates an image as the lone part
of the finance industry that has its investors’ interests at heart.26 Voting in a
manner that politicians and regulators like seems like an obvious way for
them to build on this reputation.
Recent voting on environmental issues illustrates what is happening.
Prior to 2021, the Big 3 had consistently voted against shareholder proposals
focused on environmental accountability.27 That year, they not only
supported the fundamental change at Exxon, but also vastly increased their
support for environmental proposals.28 BlackRock’s support for such

See generally STEVEN D. BLEIBERG ET AL., EPOCH INV. PARTNERS, THE IMPACT OF
PASSIVE INVESTING ON MARKET EFFICIENCY (2017); Annie Lowrey, Could Index Funds Be
‘Worse Than Marxism’?, ATLANTIC (April 5, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/arch
ive/2021/04/the-autopilot-economy/618497/; Greg Rosalsky, Is Your Retirement Fund
Ruining Our Economy?, NPR (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.npr.org/sections/money/
2019/10/08/767884839/is-your-retirement-fund-ruining-oureconomy?t=1637247577028.
21 See Jackson, supra note 1, at 1 (“Today’s [Federal Trade Commission] hearing focuses on
a pressing question in modern markets: whether institutional investors, and especially
passive index funds—the preferred savings vehicle for millions of retail investors—can
decrease competition, resulting in higher prices for American consumers.”); see generally Jose
Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513 (2018) (this seminal
work in the field first identified suppressed competition in the airline industry); Einer
Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267 (2016); Eric A. Posner et al., A
Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional Investors, 83 ANTITRUST L.J. 669
(2017).
22 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, Future of Corporate Governance, supra note 9, at 2037; Lund, supra
note 16, at 496-97.
23 Rosalsky, supra note 20.
24 Lowrey, supra note 20.
25 See Zohar Goshen & Doron Levit, Common Ownership and the Decline of the American Worker
5 (Colum. L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 653, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3832069.
26 See infra Part III.A.2.
27 See infra Part II.C.3.b.
28 See infra Part II.C.3.c.
20
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proposals was ten times higher than the previous year.29 This shift lines up
with the change from the Trump administration, which was hostile to
institutional-investor involvement in environmental issues, to the Biden
administration, which has pressed for it.30 It also accords with a policy
reversal at the Securities & Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), the
industry’s primary regulator. In 2021, the agency abandoned its long history
of focusing almost solely on mandating disclosure of financial information
to make environmental accountability a top priority.31 This abrupt change in
political winds seems to be the only thing that can explain the equally abrupt
change in asset-manager voting.
While the Big 3 may have gotten things right with Exxon, politically
motivated voting is nonetheless problematic. Stewardship theater—where
large asset managers exercise their voting rights to perform for politicians
and regulators—has procedural and substantive aspects, both of which are
problematic. The rigmarole in which asset managers take part to
demonstrate their commitment to engaged voting, or “stewardship,” is an
inefficient use of resources that could forestall beneficial regulations. But the
substantive aspect—where asset managers vote in the way politicians
want—is more worrisome. There is no reason to think politicians know how
to steer public companies, and politically motivated voting will shift with
political power, which makes companies difficult to manage.32
More problematic still, when asset managers vote to please
politicians, it is as if the politicians themselves are voting. Pandering through
stewardship, therefore, represents an indirect form of government
intervention in corporate affairs. The separation between business and
government has traditionally been sacrosanct because of the risk of

See Attracta Mooney, BlackRock Criticised Over Drop in Climate Votes, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 4,
2020), https://www.ft.com/content/7a80f33b-a0ed-4dea-b2d3-ce56381f4084 (reporting
that BlackRock supported 6% of environmental proposals in 2020); Lim & Baer, supra note
2 (reporting that BlackRock supported 64% of environmental proposals in 2021).
30 See infra text accompanying notes 320-324.
31 See infra text accompanying notes 326-328.
32 See infra Part IV.A.
29
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corruption and waste it creates.33 Government acting implicitly and indirectly
through asset managers is not state capitalism, but it poses similar risks.34
Finally, it is illegitimate for asset managers to use their voting power
to serve political ends. They vote corporate shares as trustees for the
investors in the funds they manage and are duty-bound to serve their
interests.35 When asset managers vote instead to further their own political
goals, they inappropriately leverage their fiduciary role. The conduct is
particularly egregious because the asset managers are using the voting power
that they are supposed to exercise on behalf of mutual-fund shareholders to
avert regulations intended to help them.
This fix is to give power to fund investors. Practically speaking, asset
managers currently have complete discretion over how they vote the shares
held by the funds they oversee. If asset managers were forced to tie their
votes to the preferences of fund investors, they would not be able to use
voting to their political advantage. Asset managers could theoretically seek
investor input on each matter under consideration. But the number of
votes—thousands per year36—makes this infeasible. Such a system would be
costly to administer, and many investors have little interest in this level of
involvement. Instead, asset managers should be required to poll investors
on principles and to reflect these principles in their voting. For instance,
investors could be asked if they support efforts to bring transparency to
diversity at public companies. Asset managers would then be required to
vote in proportion to their investors’ views. Because asset managers would
be deprived of voting discretion, they would be unable to use voting as a
political instrument.
Beyond its policy implications, this analysis contributes to corporategovernance theory. The Berle-Means thesis is unidimensional: its sole focus
Kateryna Holland, Government Investment in Publicly Traded Firms, 56 J. CORP. FIN. 319, 321
(2019) (“A general explanation [for the poor performance of government-owned entities]
is that governments pursue political goals–including employment maximization, domestic
investment, and even the personal financial goals of public officials–which conflict with
wealth-maximization.” (internal citations omitted)); Simon C.Y. Wong, Government
Ownership: Why This Time it Should Work, MCKINSEY & CO. (June 2009), https://www.
mckinsey.com/industries/public-and-social-sector/our-insights/government-ownershipwhy-this-time-it-should-work# (“historically, government ownership of private companies
has been notorious for lowering productivity, wasting resources, and distorting
competition—often as a result of unclear objectives, political interference, lack of discipline,
and poor transparency”).
34 See infra text accompanying notes 345-349.
35 See Proxy Voting by Investment Advisors, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585, 6586 (March 10, 2003).
36 Vanguard voted on over 100,000 shareholder proposals in 2021. VANGUARD,
INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP SEMIANNUAL REPORT 8 (2021), https://about.vanguard.
com/investment-stewardship/perspectives-and-commentary/inv_stew_2021_semiannual
_report.pdf.
33
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is on shareholder incentives to monitor managers and how weak incentives
translate to management slack. This Article shows the inadequacy of this
narrow view. The large asset managers are not ignoring their funds’ portfolio
companies, so slack is not the issue. Instead, they are using their voting
power to pursue other objectives. The policy concern is the social-welfare
impact of voting for reasons that are unrelated to firm performance. In this
era of institutional ownership, scholars must consider this additional
dimension of shareholder democracy. They must think beyond slack to the
myriad other incentives institutional investors may pursue through their
voting, and the myriad ways acting pursuant thereto can impact corporations
and society.37
Part I of this Article describes the asset-management industry and
how a few firms came to dominate it. It also discusses the potential for the
large asset managers to use the voting power that they accumulated to
resolve the agency-cost problem central to the Berle-Means thesis. Part II
undertakes a conventional law-and-economics analysis of whether their
voting practices deliver on this promise. The analysis dashes such hopes. It
shows that asset managers do not use their votes to police corporate
executives. Part III builds on this insight to advance a political theory of
asset-manager voting. It shows that large asset managers have a strong
incentive to use their power for political purposes and that politics explains
their voting record. Part IV explores the theoretical and normative
implications of this analysis. Politically motivated voting is unwelcome, but
there is a direct way to counter it—require asset managers to represent
investor preferences rather than their own.
I. ASSET MANAGERS AND CORPORATE CONTROL
The incredible growth of the asset-management industry has
transformed the way that investors engage with markets and the way
companies engage with investors. These changes substantially weaken the
In this respect, this Article intersects with two broader lines of corporate-governance
literature. The first is “principal costs,” which explores the downsides of shareholder power
and expresses skepticism regarding institutional voting. These works, however, focus on
the problems with institutional oversight from within the agency-cost framework. See, e.g.,
John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991); Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory
for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767 (2017). The other literature
involves “empty voting.” Empty voting is where voting power is decoupled from financial
risk. See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership:
Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms 61 BUS. LAWYER 1011 (2006); Jill Fisch, Mutual Fund
Stewardship and the Empty Voting Problem (European Corp. Gov. Inst. Working Paper No.
612/2021, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3939112.

37
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effectiveness of conventional tools for understanding the relationship
between equity markets and corporate governance.
A. The Structure of the Asset-Management Industry
Asset managers form and run pooled investment vehicles on behalf
of individual and institutional investors. Their core product is mutual funds.
These funds own a portfolio of securities, typically stocks or bonds.38
Investors own shares in the fund, which is usually organized as a
corporation, and are entitled to their pro rata share of the asset pool and the
related appreciation.39 The principal appeal of mutual-fund investing is
diversification. It would be too costly for most retail investors to purchase a
widely diversified stock portfolio. But a single share in an equity mutual fund
gives investors exactly that.
The portfolio of securities is the mutual fund’s only asset, and it
typically employs no one. Rather, the fund’s portfolio is managed by its asset
manager, a company like BlackRock, which has its own shareholders and
manages a number of funds.40 The top managers oversee hundreds of funds.
BlackRock, for example, manages over 600.41 Each mutual fund has an
“expense ratio.”42 This is an annual percentage-based fee that investors pay
the asset manager. A one percent expense ratio means that investors pay 1%
of their holdings in the fund to the asset manager each year. For example, in
a given year, if an investor owns $10,000 worth of shares in a fund with a
1% expense ratio, that person would owe $100 that year. The average mutual

See, e.g., Vanguard, Vanguard Mutual Funds, https://investor.vanguard.com/mutualfunds/list#/mutual-funds/asset-class/month-end-returns (last visited Feb. 7, 2022).
39 See TAMAR FRANKEL & ARTHUR B. LABY, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS:
MUTUAL FUNDS AND ADVISORS 5-29 (3rd ed. 2016).
40 Vanguard is an important exception. The vast majority of its funds are internally managed,
which means Vanguard has no external shareholders. See Jeff Schwartz, Mutual Fund Conflicts
of Interest in the Wake of the Short-term Trading Scandals: Structural Change Through Shareholder
Choice, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 91, 133-35 (2005). But they do have some externally managed
funds. See Dawn Lim & Cara Lombardo, Vanguard Is Handing Over Some of Its Voting Power,
Wall St. J. (Apr. 25, 2019) https://www.wsj.com/articles/vanguard-is-handing-over-someof-its-voting-power-11556190120?mod=article_inline (reporting that 9% of Vanguard’s
funds are externally managed). This structure should not materially impact Vanguard’s
voting incentives.
41 See BlackRock, Investment Funds, https://www.blackrock.com/us/individual/products
/investmentfunds#!type=mutualFunds&style=All&view=perfNa (last visited, Dec. 11,
2021) (listing 611 funds).
42 For an overview of mutual-fund fees, see SEC, Investor.gov., Mutual Fund Fees and
Expenses, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/m
utual-fund-fees-and-expenses (last visited Jan 14, 2022).
38
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fund fee was .41% in 2020.43 The profits derived from fees charged to
mutual-fund shareholders generate returns for the asset manager’s
shareholders.
Managing mutual funds is a lucrative business. Returns to
shareholders in asset managers are almost 3-times that of the portfolio
companies in which their affiliated funds invest. In 2018, the industry
operating margin was 31.1%,44 while the profit margin for the S&P 500 (a
list of 500 of the largest companies) was around 13%.45
A key distinction in equity mutual funds is between actively and
passively managed funds. In actively managed equity funds, the asset
manager attempts to pick undervalued stocks for the fund’s portfolio in the
hopes of earning returns above the market average. In passively managed
funds, also called index funds, there is no active stock-picking. The fund
simply invests in an index of securities like the S&P 500. Whereas the returns
in an actively managed fund are, at least in part, determined by the skill of
the manager. In an index fund, the investors solely earn the market return,
minus fees. Index funds typically charge much lower fees than actively
managed funds.46 Some even charge no fee.47 There is a near consensus that
when fees are considered, index funds outperform funds that are actively
managed.48
The asset-management industry is enormous. At the end of 2020,
there were over 9,000 mutual funds and 2,000 ETFs,49 with total assets of
$29.3 trillion.50 For comparison, the U.S. GDP for 2020 was about $21

See 2020 U.S. Fund Fee Study 1, MORNINGSTAR (Aug. 2021).
Stewart L. Brown & Steven Pomerantz, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: Sponsors Game the System
as Watchdogs Slumber, 15 OHIO ST. BUS. L. J. 29, 39 (2021).
45 CSI Market, Total Market Profitability, https://csimarket.com/Industry/industry_Profit
ability_Ratios.php?&hist=12 (last visited Jan. 14, 2022).
46 See 2020 U.S. Fund Fee Study, supra note 43, at 2 (reporting average index fund fees of
.11% and actively managed fund fees of .62%).
47 See Jeff Sommer, A Price War Has Driven Fund Fees to Zero. They May Be Set to Drop Further.,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/business/price-warfund-fees-zero-negative.html.
48 See, e.g., Active/Passive Barometer, MORNINGSTAR (Oct. 2021) (“In general, actively managed
funds have failed to survive and beat their passive peers, especially over longer time
horizons.”). There is some evidence to the contrary. See generally Jonathan B. Berk & Jules
H. van Binsbergen, Measuring Skill in the Mutual Fund Industry, 118 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2015)
(discussing conflicting evidence and finding that active management adds value).
49 INV. CO. INST., 2021 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 40 fig. 2.1 (61st ed.) (2021).
ETFs are basically the same as mutual funds, except mutual-fund shares are bought and
sold directly from the fund, whereas ETFs are publicly traded. See id. at 94. The distinction
is irrelevant for this Article as voting is handled identically.
50 Id. at 42 fig. 2.3.
43
44
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trillion.51 There are over 804 asset managers,52 but almost 50% of industry
assets are overseen by three companies (the Big 3, plus Fidelity and the
Capital Group) with the remaining 799 managing the rest.53 The Big 3
specialize in index funds, which have grown tremendously in the last decade.
Index fund assets now total almost $10 trillion, up from under $2 trillion 10
years ago.54 Vanguard alone manages around 76% of index-fund assets.55
A significant part of the success of mutual funds comes from a
transformation in the way Americans fund retirement. In the last 40 years,
there has been a major shift from defined benefit plans, where employers
provide employees with guaranteed income after retirement, to defined
contribution plans, like 401(k)s, where employees self-fund their retirements
in tax-favored accounts.56 Asset managers run these accounts. Vanguard, for
example, manages corporate 401(k) plans and channels company employees
to its funds to house their 401(k) savings.57 Mutual funds hold $11.1 trillion
in 401(k) and related assets,58 and Vanguard and BlackRock are the leaders
in the space.59 Before the introduction of 401(k)s in 1982,60 asset managers
were minor players in equity markets. In 1981, their affiliated mutual funds
See The World Bank, Data, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.cd?
locations=US (last visited Jan. 14, 2022).
52 INV. CO. INST., supra note 49, at 54 fig. 2.12.
53 Jeff Tjornehoj, Exploring Fund Industry Concentration: The Good, The Bad, and The Unknown,
BROADRIDGE 3-4 & tbl. 2 (2018); see also Bob Eccles, Concentration in the Asset Management
Industry: Implications for Corporate Engagement, FORBES (April 17, 2019), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/bobeccles/2019/04/17/concentration-in-the-asset-management-industryimplications-for-corporate-engagement/#bf13c44402f5 (discussing implications of
concentration in the asset-management industry).
54 INV. CO. INST., supra note 49, at 49 fig. 2.8 (figure includes ETFs).
55 See Tjornehoj, supra note 53, at 5 tbl. 7.
56 The tax subsidy on which 401(k)s are based, which allows employees to fund their
retirement accounts with pre-tax dollars, is valued at around $90 billion. See OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2020 199 tbl.16-4 (2020). This subsidy not only benefits
savers, but also mutual funds, whose assets have swelled because of it and who collect fees
based on the pre-tax asset base. For a discussion of the origins of the 401(k), see Timothy
W. Martin, The Champions of the 401(k) Lament the Revolution They Started, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 2,
2017) https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-champions-of-the-401-k-lament-the-revolutionthey-started-1483382348. For a critique of 401(k)s on policy grounds, see Jeff Schwartz,
Rethinking 401(k)s, 49 HARV. J. LEG. 53 (2012).
57 See Veronika K. Pool, It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans,
71 J. FIN. 1779, 1780 (2016) (finding “significant favoritism” toward funds affiliated with
the 401(k) administrator).
58 INV. CO. INST., supra note 49, at 197.
59 See Robert Steyer, Overall Assets Jump Nearly 22% for Top 25 Firms, PENSION &
INVESTMENTS (June 1, 2020), https://www.pionline.com/largest-money-managers/
overall-assets-jump-nearly-22-top-25-firms.
60 Rydqvist et al., supra note 10, at 1-2.
51
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held under 3%61 of the stock of public companies compared with 30% at
the end of 2020.62
B. Voting Power and Stewardship
The voting power of asset managers has swelled with mutual-fund
assets. With rare exception, each additional share a fund accumulates comes
with voting rights.63 Even though it is the fund shareholders who benefit
directly from appreciation in those shares, mutual funds technically own the
shares on the shareholders’ behalf, and the asset managers that oversee the
funds control how the funds vote. As corporate shareholders, mutual funds
vote on shareholder proposals and the annual election of directors, as well
as other fundamental matters, like whether to amend corporate governing
documents, dissolve, or merge.64 The Dodd-Frank Act also gave publiccompany shareholders a nonbinding vote on executive compensation,
frequently referred to as a “say on pay.”65
While none of the above give shareholders direct power over how
businesses are run, all are important. Shareholder proposals are non-binding,
but boards nevertheless take them seriously. They tend to address
environmental, social, and corporate governance (“ESG”) matters.
Corporate governance proposals typically call for removing barriers to
shareholder voting power.66 Social and environmental proposals often call
for transparency about employee diversity and environmental risks and
impacts.67
Id. at 2.
INV. CO. INST., supra note 49, at i.
63 See Hu & Black, supra note 37, at 1013 (2006) (discussing the one-share one-vote structure
of public companies); Jeff Schwartz, De Facto Shareholder Primacy, 79 U. MD. L. REV. 652, 686
(2020) (discussing rarity of reduced shareholder voting rights among public companies).
64 See Del. Gen. Corp. L. 242, 251 (2020).
65 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21 (2020).
66 See Bebchuk & Hirst, Future of Corporate Governance, supra note 9, at 2101-02 (discussing
changes to corporate governance arising from shareholder-proposal process); Roberta
Karmel, Voting Power Without Responsibility or Risk–How Should Proxy Reform Address the
Decoupling of Economic and Voting Rights?, 55 VILL. L. REV. 93, 106-08 (2010) (same).
67 See Marc Treviño et al., 2021 Proxy Season Review: Shareholder Proposals on
Environmental Matters, HARV. LAW SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Aug. 11, 2021),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/08/11/2021-proxy-season-review-shareholderproposals-on-environmental-matters/ (“[M]ost environmental proposals focused more
generally on companies’ commitment to adopting sustainability disclosure and policies.”);
Shirley Westcott et al., 2021 Proxy Season Review, HARV. LAW SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. &
FIN. REG. (Aug. 5, 2021), https:/corpgovlaw.harvard.edu/2021/08/05/2021-proxyseason-review/?utm_source=pocket_mylist (listing different types of environmental and
social proposals).
61
62
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Although social and environmental proposals enjoyed little success
until very recently, governance proposals have done well for years.68 As a
result, they have led to significant changes. Among them, a large majority of
S&P 500 companies now require annual election of directors rather than
allow directors to serve staggered multiyear terms and require that directors
in uncontested elections receive a majority of votes cast for reelection.69
Annual elections empower shareholders because it means an entire board
can be replaced at once. Majority-voting requirements allow shareholders to
express disapproval of board members by casting ballots to “withhold”
votes for their reelection. This empowers shareholders because if a majority
withholds their votes for particular board members, they are removed even
if their seats are uncontested.
These corporate-governance changes have triggered increased
shareholder engagement. In particular, hedge-fund activists purchase small
ownership stakes in target firms, demand changes, and then sell once their
changes are adopted.70 If companies refuse, funds appeal to shareholders to
vote out intransigent directors at the next annual election and support the
funds’ slate of directors instead.71 These so-called proxy contests often
succeed.72
Because of their vast holdings, the Big 3 largely dictate the outcome
of shareholder proposals and activist campaigns. They are not majority
shareholders, but their ownership stakes are substantial: Vanguard owns
9.8% of the shares of S&P 500 firms, BlackRock 7.6%, and State Street
5.6%,73 for a total of 23%.74 This is enough to make them, collectively, the
largest shareholder in 88% of S&P 500 companies.75 In addition, asset
managers vote essentially all of their share while retail investors vote under
one-third.76 This means that the above figures understate the Big 3’s
influence. Scholars estimate that their ownership is more like 30% when

See sources cited supra note 66.
MARK S. GERBER, U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: FROM THE FRYING PAN INTO THE
FIRE? 1-2 (2020), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2020/01/2020-insight
s/us-corporate-governance.
70 See Schwartz, supra note 63, at 679.
71 See id.
72 See INSIGHTIA, THE PROXY VOTING ANNUAL REVIEW 2021, at 20 (showing activists
winning at least one board seat or settling almost half the time).
73 Bebchuk & Hirst, Power of the Big Three, supra note 9, at 9 tbl. 2 (reporting ownership
percentages from 2020).
74 Id.
75 Fichtner et al., supra note 2, at 313.
76 See PROXY PULSE, 2019 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 5 (2019), https://www.broadridge
.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge-proxypulse-2019-review.pdf.
68
69
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their higher voting rate is considered.77 When a few other giant asset
managers are added into the mix, these numbers swell even further.
It might seem unfair to group the asset managers with the funds they
oversee. The Big 3 manage hundreds of funds, but the funds technically own
and vote the shares. In theory, these funds could vote their own shares and
do so in opposite directions. Their asset-manager affiliation would be
irrelevant. In practice, however, independent voting is rare. A centralized
stewardship team at the asset manager makes voting recommendations and
individual funds rarely depart from them.78
In addition, the large asset managers vote alike. A recent empirical
study tracked asset-manager voting on shareholder proposals from 2010 –
2015.79 It found a high correlation across the industry. Asset managers voted
the same way on shareholder proposals 79% of the time.80 The study also
grouped asset managers into different “parties” based on their voting
patterns.81 The Big 3, along with the other largest managers, belong to the
Traditional Governance Party.82 This party backs proposals like those
mentioned above, which support the shareholder franchise.83 Members of
the Traditional Governance Party hold 66% of mutual-fund assets84 and vote
together approximately 88% of the time.85 It makes sense, therefore, to treat
the Big 3, and other large asset managers, as a voting block.
This block dictates the outcomes of controversial shareholder
proposals and proxy contests.86 Conservatively assume that the Big 3 control
25% of the vote. For them to be on the losing side of a matter, the owners
See Bebchuk & Hirst, Power of the Big Three, supra note 9, at 59.
See Bebchuk & Hirst, Future of Corporate Governance, supra note 9, at 2050; Fichtner et al.,
supra note 2, at 317 (discussing rarity of internally conflicting votes); Lim & Baer, supra note
2 (“Although different BlackRock funds’ voting decisions can diverge from the BlackRock
stewardship team, that doesn’t happen often.”); Alon Brav et al., Picking Friends Before Picking
(Proxy) Fights: How Mutual Fund Voting Shapes Proxy Contests 15 (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst.,
Finance Working Paper No. 601/2019 2019), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3101473
(finding that a fund diverges from its family in 5.5% of proxy contests).
79 Ryan Bubb & Emiliano Katan, The Party Structure of Mutual Funds 8 (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst.
Law Working Paper 560/2020, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3124039.
80 Id. at 22.
81 Id. at 3.
82 This party also includes other significant fund managers, like Fidelity and JP Morgan. Id.
at 42 tbl 4.
83 Id. at 24.
84 Bubb & Catan, supra note 79, at 22.
85 More precisely, for shareholder proposals, 12% of votes were cast against the majority
position. Id.; see also Bebchuk & Hirst, Power of the Big Three, supra note 9, at 21 (“[W]hile
the votes of the Big Three are generally not identical, they are significantly correlated.”)
86 See Coates, supra note 1, at 14 (describing the Big 3’s votes as “pivotal”); Fisch et al., supra
note 9, at 26 (same).
77
78
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of 68% of the remaining shares would have to disagree with them.87 This is
an extremely high bar, particularly given that asset managers tend to vote
similarly, and that the remaining shareholders are dispersed and less likely to
vote.
It is sometimes argued that, because controversial matters are
uncommon, the top asset managers are not actually that powerful.88 But this
is unconvincing. Power matters when votes are contested. The Big 3 cast the
decisive votes to change the makeup of Exxon’s board.89 In the muchpublicized proxy contest at Dupont in 2015, the Big 3 sided with
management. Again, their votes were determinative. Trian Partners, the
hedge-fund activist, lost even though it won a majority of the other
investors.90
Moreover, even if there is little dissent as to a particular vote, it does
not mean the top managers are less powerful. A majority shareholder is no
less powerful on matters where the minority shareholder agrees. The reality
is that the majority shareholder is in control. While the biggest asset
managers are not majority owners, they are extremely powerful
blockholders. The concentration of power in their hands is unprecedented,
and potentially upends the Berle-Means thesis, which has dominated
corporate-governance thinking for 100 years.
C. The Twilight of The Berle-Means Thesis
The Berle-Means thesis frames the separation of ownership from
control as the central dilemma of corporate law.91 According to this theory,
the professional managers who control public companies are duty-bound to

For simplicity, assume there are 100 shares and the Big 3 hold 25 of them (25%). Out of
the 75 remaining, 51 would have to disagree, which is 68%.
88 See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1778 (arguing that there is a “limited” number of
“consequential” proxy contests).
89 The Big 3 held more than 20% of Exxon’s shares. Steven Mufson, A Bad Day for Big Oil,
WASH PO. (May 26, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/
2021/05/26/exxonmobil-rebel-shareholders-win-board-seats/. The three dissident
candidates would not have survived a 20% shift to the three incumbents. See Exxon 8-K,
June 2, 2021 (calculations on file with author).
90 Fichtner et al., supra note 2, at 309 (“The outcome of this high profile proxy contest was
determined when the Big Three disclosed that they were voting all their shares in favor of”
the incumbent.); Tom Hals, DuPont Wins Board Proxy Fight Against Activist Investor Peltz,
REUTERS (May 13, 2015), https:/www.reuters.com/article/us-dupont-trian-idUSKBN
0NY1JI20150513 (reporting that “Trian won the majority of non-index institutions and
would have prevailed had one of those three index funds voted differently”).
91 See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 11, at 112-16.
87
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represent the owners of the corporation, its shareholders.92 But they may
shirk or self-deal if shareholders do not actively oversee them. Shareholders,
however, suffer from a collective-action problem, which disincentivizes this
very thing. Although faithful management would benefit all shareholders,
challenging inept, lazy, or corrupt managers is expensive and uncertain while
any increased profits from a successful intervention are shared pro rata with
other shareholders.93
The incentive problem is most acute when share ownership is
dispersed among many investors with small interests, as it was for most of
the stock market’s history. If shareholders with small stakes intervene, they
internalize all the costs, but only a sliver of the gains, making it much better
to sell and invest elsewhere when displeased with management. The theory
predicts that shareholders will abide by these incentives, leaving
management to do as they please at shareholders’ expense.94 The lost
shareholder value has come to be known as agency costs.95
Though the collective-action logic of Berle-Means is timeless, the
agency-cost concern it highlights is much less salient today. Because of
exchange rules requiring majority independent boards,96 because of
structural changes to corporate governance initiated through the
shareholder-proposal process,97 and because of a shift to stock-based
compensation,98 management is much more responsive to shareholders than
in the past.99
Against this backdrop, socially minded shareholders pressure
corporate management to change diversity and environmental practices,100
while hedge-fund activists lean on them to increase stock prices.101 Each
Shareholders are conventionally conceptualized as the owners of corporations, but this
view is contested. See Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA.
L. REV. 2003, 2013 n.45 (2013).
93 See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 11, at 8-9, 86-87.
94 See id.
95 See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907,
1913 (2013).
96 See NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES 5605 (2021), http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NAS
DAQ/Main/; NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.01 (2021), https://nyseguide.
srorules.com/listed-company-manual.
97 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
98 See Theo Francis & Inti Pacheco, From Tesla to GE, See How Much CEOs Made in 2020,
WALL ST. J. (June 1, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/from-tesla-to-ge-see-howmuch-ceos-made-in-2020-11622539802; Rock, supra note 95, at 1917-18, 2024.
99 See Rock, supra note 95, at 1917-1926 (reviewing evidence of reduced agency costs).
100 See Paul Kiernan, SEC Raises Bar for Shareholder Resolution, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-raises-bar-for-shareholder-resolutions-11600877050.
101 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective
on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870,
92
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year, activists launch hundreds of challenges,102 and other shareholders make
hundreds of social and environmental proposals.103 Satisfying these groups
is now a fundamental part of public-company management.
Because large asset managers decide whether activist challenges and
shareholder proposals succeed, they are the most important players in
corporate governance. In the twilight of Berle-Means, the central question
—what drives their voting—remains unresolved. If they are careful stewards
of their clients’ money, committed to maximizing the long-term value of the
companies held in the funds they oversee, then the agency-cost problem has
been largely solved. It is also possible, however, that they are just as apathetic
as retail investors and squander their power, leaving behind stubborn agency
costs, or that other incentives determine how they vote, leading to a different
set of concerns.
II. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ASSET-MANAGER STEWARDSHIP
Recent scholarship has sought to understand whether asset
managers’ participation in corporate governance finally resolves, or at least
substantially ameliorates, the agency-cost problem that stems from the
separation of ownership from control. To provide an answer, scholars have
focused on whether it is profitable for asset managers to actively engage in
voting as a strategy to improve the performance of portfolio firms.104 The
logic being that if active engagement is profitable, then the asset managers
will act accordingly, and agency costs will shrink.
In this section, I synthesize and build on the competing threads of
literature to offer my own analysis. I conclude that it is unprofitable for asset
managers to try to improve portfolio firms through participation in
corporate governance, which means that other considerations must drive
how they vote.
A. Asset-Manager Incentives to Engage in Stewardship
To begin, there is some reason to believe that large asset managers
may be more involved with corporate governance than retail investors. Their
1892 (2017) (“[A]ctivist hedge funds identify companies and take an equity position in them
only when they have identified a way to change the corporation’s operations in a manner
that the hedge fund believes will cause its stock price to rise.”).
102 See Schwartz, supra note 63, at 685.
103 See GIBSON DUNN, SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE 2021
PROXY SEASON 4-5 (2021), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/
08/shareholder-proposal-developments-during-the-2021-proxy-season.pdf.
104 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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size means that the collective-action problem that condemns retail investors
to apathy is less problematic. Since large asset managers own significant
percentages of portfolio companies, gains from intervention may be big
enough to justify the associated expense even if the profits must be shared
with other shareholders.105
And expenses should not be a problem for the Big 3 and other large
asset managers. They manage trillions of dollars and can spread diligence
costs across the funds they manage.106 There is also a good chance that the
money will be well spent. Since they control so many votes, it is likely their
positions will prevail.107 They also benefit from spillover effects. Stock
research for asset-allocation decisions should generate much of the
knowledge necessary for informed voting.108 All of this provides hope that
the large asset managers might provide the management oversight that was
lacking when retail investors dominated the market.
The hope slowly fades, however, when one focuses on the
institutional details of asset management. The link between engaged voting,
improved portfolio-firm performance, and asset-manager profits is much
more attenuated than in the case of the idealized blockholder. To see this,
think of asset managers as profit-maximizing actors. They maximize profits
by maximizing fee income (minus associated expenses). They maximize fee
income by maximizing assets under management (“AUM”) and expense
ratios across their family of funds.
Engaged voting has the potential to increase asset managers’ AUM.
Careful oversight, and the threat thereof, should cause corporate managers
to perform their jobs more carefully, which should improve firm
performance, which should increase the value of portfolio companies. More
valuable companies means higher AUM. Increased performance also may
attract new investors, which would further increase AUM,109 and may give
asset managers a justification for raising fees. Thus, asset managers have the
incentive to invest in corporate oversight to the extent that increases in
AUM and fees justify the associated costs.
In theory, managers of index funds have the most to gain from
stewardship. Active managers primarily try to improve performance through
their stock picking. But index-fund managers cannot choose their
Fisch et al., supra note 9, at 38.
Id. at 39.
107 See id. at 38.
108 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1800.
109 See, e.g., Jonathan Lewellen & Katharina Lewellen, Institutional Investors and Corporate
Governance: The Incentive to Be Engaged 2 (Tuck Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 3265761,
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3265761 (finding that “a one percentage point increase
in an institution’s benchmark-adjusted quarterly return predicts a 1.29 percentage point …
increase in net inflow over the subsequent ten quarters”).
105
106
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investments. Thus, the only way to improve performance and generate the
increased profits that come with it is through monitoring their portfolio
companies.110 Since the Big 3 specialize in managing index funds, this might
suggest an inclination towards stewardship.
It turns out, however, that even for the Big 3, the gains from
stewardship are minimal. The increase in AUM from actively participating
in corporate governance at portfolio firms is speculative and small, and
offset by numerous potential losses, and there is little hope that such
engagement would allow managers to increase fees.
B. The Illusory Promise of Stewardship Profits
Neither active engagement, where asset managers initiate
management challenges, nor passive engagement, where they choose
whether to support these challenges, offers the prospect of profits. First
consider active engagement. In this type, shareholders identify
underperforming companies in their portfolio, insist on operational or
personnel changes, and launch proxy contests if management resists.
Professors Bebchuk and Hirst argue that the Big 3 should engage with their
portfolio companies at this level.111
Profitability dictates otherwise, however. It is hard to identify
performance-enhancing improvements. Because their compensation
depends on it, executives at public companies already have great incentive
to keep stock prices high. There is also an expertise gap. Although the Big 3
are sophisticated investors, they are still outsiders and, as such, are inherently
less informed about company operations.112 Plus, it is hard to imagine that
they, or other large asset managers, are in the best position to engage in this
sort of activism. Identifying and resolving underperformance issues is not
their area of expertise. For these reasons, active engagement is unlikely to
generate a positive return.
It makes more sense for large asset managers to let hedge-fund
activists fight these battles. Active engagement is exactly what they are
designed for.113 Instead of getting their hands dirty, the large asset managers
See Fisch et al., supra note 9, at 32, 35.
See Bebchuk & Hirst, Future of Corporate Governance, supra note 9, at 2095.
112 See Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund Industry, 139. U. PENN. L.
REV. 1469, 1502 (1991) (“Financial institutions would not generally be better informed than
incumbent managers who have spent a lifetime in their business.”).
113 See Jill Fisch, The Uncertain Stewardship Potential of Mutual Funds, in GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER
STEWARDSHIP: COMPLEXITIES, CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES 112-13 (Dionysia
Katelouzou & Dan W. Puchniak eds., forthcoming) (discussing why hedge funds are wellsuited for activism).
110
111
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can limit their involvement to deciding which activist challenges to support.
Letting the activists take the lead allows them to get the benefit of any
performance improvements without incurring the significant costs involved
with identifying underperformers, figuring out what is wrong, and lobbying
for change.114
There are problems, however, with even this more modest form of
engagement. For it to prove profitable, the gains from hedge-fund activism
must outweigh the costs involved in deciding which challenges to back.
Even this is doubtful.
Asset managers internalize only a small portion of the gains from
activism. Because the mutual funds that asset managers oversee are
diversified and asset managers are further diversified across funds, even the
biggest managers hold less than 10% of any portfolio company’s stock.115
The asset managers’ gains are the fees associated with the activist-driven
increase on this holding. In 2020, Vanguard’s average fee was .09%, State
Street’s was .16%, and BlackRock’s was .25%.116
Say an activist increases the value of a firm by $100 million in the
first year, Vanguard’s share, assuming a 10% holding and its average fee,
would be $9,000.117 Vanguard would earn this additional fee each year for as
long as the increase in value remained. A $100 million improvement may be
worth it for an activist hedge fund with a concentrated ownership position,
but the resulting gain is a pittance for a large asset manager. And the above
calculation is an overstatement.
Typically, hedge-fund activists call for actions that create short-term
price boosts, like cuts to research and development or stock buybacks.118
There is significant debate about whether such actions come at the expense
of long-term gains.119 One recent study found, for example, that “long-term
returns [from activism] insignificantly differ from zero.”120 Thus, the asset
managers’ bump today may reverse in the future.
Professors Gilson and Gordon celebrate the symbiotic relationship between asset
managers and hedge-fund activists—where activists target underperformers and asset
managers give or withhold their support—as an efficient allocation of corporate
governance. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 9, at 867.
115 See Bebchuk & Hirst, The Power of the Big Three, supra note 9, at 9 tbl. 2 (reporting
median ownership percentages of the Big 3 for the S&P 500).
116 See 2020 U.S. Fund Fee Study, supra note 43, at 15.
117 The math is $100,000,000*.1*.0009. Estimates of the dollar value of hedge-fund activism
vary, but the above example may be generous. See Ed deHaan et al., Long-Term Economic
Consequences of Hedge Fund Activist Interventions, 40 tbl 3. (Stanford Rock Center for Corporate
Governance Working Paper No. 236, 2018) (finding an immediate change to market value
of $22 million that declines to $3.4 million one year later).
118 See Schwartz, supra note 63, at 680.
119 See deHaan, supra note 117, at 8-13 (reviewing empirical findings).
120 Id. at 4.
114
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Large asset managers like the Big 3 also have their bond funds to
consider. Stock buybacks and other moves that activists push increase
leverage, which hurts bondholders. Thus, increased asset-management fees
from improved stock performance are offset by decreases in bond
performance.121 Whether activism is a net positive depends on the asset
manager’s mix between stock and bond funds.
Activists also often push for a sale of the target company.122 A sale
increases the stock price of the target, but the asset manager may have
holdings in the acquiring firm, which typically drops in value.123 This tradeoff
illustrates a broader market reality, which is that gains at one firm may come
at the expense of others. If an activist-inspired change makes one company
better than its competitors, then that does nothing for an asset manager that
also owns stock in the competitors. 124 It could even hurt. If an asset manager
owns more stock in the competitor firms, an improvement in one of its
portfolio holdings might reduce overall profits.
Finally, supporting activists might hurt important relationships with
portfolio companies. Taking the opposite side of management in a proxy
contest could, for instance, threaten the prospects of administering that
firm’s 401(k) plan.125 Not only would the asset manager lose the
administrative fees, but its AUM would also suffer because it would no
longer be able to channel that company’s employees to its funds.126 Managers
of active funds might also profit by receiving quasi-inside information from
corporate executives that aids in their stock picking.127 Supporting activists
could cause this well to run dry.
In sum, while some hedge-fund activism may increase short-term
returns, the bump potentially comes, at least in part, at the cost of long-term
returns, bondholders, other companies in the asset managers’ funds, and
from the asset manager’s 401(k) business. By the time all of this is
considered, any profits evaporate. The $9,000 gain from the example above
is more likely close to $0. With nothing to gain, it is not worth investing
much in assessing the relative merits of activist proposals.
See John D. Morley, Too Big To Be Activist, 92 U.S.C. L. REV. 1407, 1439-40 (2019).
See Schwartz, supra note 63, at 680.
123 See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 142425 (2007).
124 According to modern portfolio theory, diversification—the sin qua non of mutual funds—
cancels out activist gains because they are largely offset by losses at competitor firms in a
fully diversified portfolio. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Stewardship 2 (Working Paper,
Feb. 2021) (on file with author).
125 See Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy S. Lund, Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in Corporate Law, 99
B.U. L. REV. 1151, 1157 (2019).
126 See Pool, supra note 57, at 1788.
127See Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1810.
121
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The other interventions that asset managers are asked to consider
are ESG shareholder proposals. None yield obvious gains to asset managers.
As noted above, governance proposals, like destaggering boards, typically
disempower corporate executives in favor of shareholders.128 Increasing
management’s accountability to shareholders may reduce agency costs, but
it does not necessarily increase firm value.
Corporate executives are experts in the businesses they run. They
know more than even the most sophisticated shareholders, and there is no
reason to assume ex ante that they are doing a poor job. The correct balance
between directorial and shareholder power is endogenous, in that it is firmspecific, and dynamic, in that it varies with who is in charge.129 Good
managers will relish the flexibility that comes with insulation from
shareholder oversight; bad managers will use the flexibility to slack off or
tunnel firm assets for personal gain. This variability is likely the reason that
empirical evidence fails to show that increased shareholder power improves
firm performance.130
Since management quality varies across firms and across time, there
is no one-size-fits-all approach to corporate governance.131 As such, simply
supporting corporate-governance proposals is not a profitable voting
strategy for asset managers. While it is possible that there are some
companies where corporate-governance changes could lead to improved
performance, determining which they are is difficult, if not impossible.132
And, as above, any firm-level performance improvements would not
necessarily translate to asset-manager profits. Asset managers would only
receive the increase in fees generated from slightly higher AUM. Moreover,
any profits from higher fees would be offset by other losses. Because
shareholders prefer risk and bondholders prefer safety, bondholders suffer
when shareholders gain power.133 Moreover, if the governance changes
succeed in making targets more competitive, then this hurts competitor
See Goshen & Levit, supra note 25 at 5.
See Goshen & Squire, supra note 37, at 774; See, e.g., Yakov Amihud et al., Settling the
Staggered Board Debate, 166 U. PENN. L REV. 1475, 1480 (2018) (finding that the value of
staggered boards is endogenous).
130 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 37, at 810-25 (surveying mixed empirical evidence on
the value of varied corporate-governance structures).
131 See id. at 773 (“[B]ecause the impact of a given governance structure on control costs is
firm-specific, there is no particular governance structure that can be described as
intrinsically good, bad, welfare enhancing, or inefficient.”).
132 See Ronald Gilson, Legal and Political Challenges to Corporate Purpose, 31 J. APP. CORP. FIN.
1, 9 (2019) (“[F]or investors, distinguishing between shortsighted and well-disciplined
managements—and between farsighted companies and those for whom the payoff will
never materialize—is often impossible.”).
133 See Rock, supra note 95, at 1926-30 (discussing shareholder-creditor agency costs).
128
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firms in the asset manager’s funds. Finally, supporting measures that take
power away from management strains relationships with them at the
expense of potential 401(k) business.
The prospects of asset-manager profits from supporting “social”
shareholder proposals is even more tenuous. Take initiatives that aim to
increase diversity, for instance. It can be argued that diversity improves
returns because it brings a broader range of voices to bear on management
decisions.134 This is a plausible theory, but it lacks empirical support.135 As
with corporate-governance changes, the value proposition is unclear.
Environmental proposals typically seek more disclosure regarding a
company’s environmental footprint or exposure to climate-change risk.136
Some argue that these measures increase the value of target firms.137 But this
claim is dubious. Environmental harms are the archetypical negative
externality, meaning firms gain by ignoring their environmental impact. A
better argument for these proposals is that they encourage companies to act
more sustainably. Because more sustainable corporate conduct reduces the
climate-change risk that overhangs the stock market, the additional
environmental transparency would increase the value of all firms.138
This theory—that voting to reduce climate-change risk is profitable
for asset managers—is attractive because the increased AUM from the
reduced risk would not be offset by losses in bond funds or by losses at
other portfolio companies. Nevertheless, the case for profitability is highly
theoretical. It assumes that the proposals lead to changes in corporate
See Peter Eavis, Board Diversity Increased in 2021. Some Ask What Took So Long, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 3, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/03/business/corporate-board-diversit
y.html (“Proponents of greater diversity argue that female and nonwhite board members
bring different experience and knowledge, especially about markets and customers that
existing directors might not know well. That should, over time, lead to greater profits, higher
sales and better morale among employees.”).
135 See Jesse M. Fried, Will Nasdaq’s Diversity Rules Harm Investors? 2 (European Corp. Gov.
Inst. Working Paper No. 579/2021, 2021) (reviewing empirical evidence and finding that
“increasing board diversity may well reduce investors’ return”). The SEC noted when
blessing Nasdaq’s board diversity rule that studies on the “effects of board diversity are
generally inconclusive.” Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC;
Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, as Modified by Amendments No. 1, To Adopt
Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity and To Offer Certain Listed Companies Access to
a Complimentary Board Recruiting Service, 86 Fed. Reg. 44424, 44432 (Aug. 6, 2021)
[hereinafter Nasdaq Diversity-Rule Approval].
136 See Treviño et al., supra note 67.
137 Witold Henisz et al., Five Ways that ESG Creates Value, MCKINSEY QUARTERLY (Nov.
2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Business%20Functions/
Strategy%20and%20Corporate%20Finance/Our%20Insights/Five%20ways%20that%20
ESG%20creates%20value/Five-ways-that-ESG-creates-value.ashx.
138 See Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2020);
Gordon, supra note 124, at 29.
134
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behavior, that climate-change risk is priced into the market, and that any loss
to a company from the disclosure of questionable practices, or from
adopting more sustainable practices, is made up by the market-wide gain and
the gain to other firms. There is no empirical evidence suggesting that these
assumptions hold true.
Finally, the economic analysis of environmental and social (“ES”)
proposals does not capture the true impetus behind them. Social proposals
are more about advancing inclusion as a social good than about increasing
shareholder returns; environmental proposals are more about concerns over
pollution and climate change.139 Because of the significant societal overtones,
it is doubtful that the profit potential of these proposals drives asset
managers’ positions on them.
C. The Illusory Promise of Additional Fund Flows and Higher Fees
It could be argued that the above analysis ignores the potential for
asset managers to profit from increased cash flows into their funds and
higher fees. In theory, smart voting should improve the performance of asset
managers’ funds; investors should notice and direct their money
accordingly.140 The theoretical results are more assets and perhaps even
higher fees justified by improved performance.
Such hopes, however, are fanciful. While some studies have shown
that mutual-fund investors chase performance,141 there is a lot of friction in
the market. Most importantly, many invest in the Big 3 and other large asset
managers through 401(k) plans,142 and these investors are stuck. 401(k) plans
typically offer many different types of funds, but do not offer competing
funds of the same type.143 Therefore, it is not feasible for 401(k) investors to
simply move to a similar fund with a better return.
More problematic, even successful stewardship that leads to
improved firm performance may not generate a competitive advantage for
the asset manager’s funds. Funds are only at a competitive advantage when
their return exceeds their competitors’ returns after fees. The problem with
Elad L. Roisman, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm., Keynote Address at the Society
for Corporate Governance National Conf. (July 7, 2020) https://www.sec.gov/news
/speech/roisman-keynote-society-corporate-governance-national-conference-2020
#_ftnref13 (“‘E’ and ‘S’ matters tend to be more society, or stakeholder, focused.”).
140 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1793.
141 See id. at 1793-94.
142 See Steyer, supra note 59.
143 See Pool, supra note 57, at 1788 (“[A]ffiliated funds are more likely to be more basic
investment options (such as standard domestic equity funds or passively managed index
funds), whereas unaffiliated funds are more likely to be specialized funds (such as
international or sector funds)”).
139
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stewardship as a competitive tool is that competing mutual funds own many
of the same firms. If an asset manager engineers an increase at one of the
firms in one of its funds, it shares the gains pro rata with competing funds.
Because of this overlapping ownership, there is only a competitive advantage
for stewardship when funds own proportionally more shares in the target
firm than its competitors.144 If it owns proportionally fewer, then the
intervention actually worsens the fund’s competitive position. For index
funds, there is no hope for competitive advantage through stewardship.
Since index funds own the same firms in the same proportions as other index
funds, they cannot outcompete other index funds by improving the
performance of their portfolio firms.145
Beyond that, there is no reliable way to know exactly what
competitor funds own. Mutual funds must publicly disclose their holdings
every quarter,146 but they file these reports up to 60 days from quarter end.147
The holdings information is, therefore, out of date. And even if this
information were obtainable, it would not be useful. The competitive
landscape at the asset-manager level is enormously complex. The different
funds that they oversee have different portfolio mixes and different
competitors. Stewardship would inevitably advance the competitive interests
of some of their funds and hurt others. Thus, any competitive gains at one
fund would be offset by diminished competitiveness at others.
Finally, all of this assumes that engaged voting is cost-free, or at least
can be accomplished without increasing investor fees. But, of course,
informed engagement in corporate governance is not free. It is either paid
for out of the asset manager’s profits or out of increased fees. Asset
managers will be loath to give up profits to fund stewardship. Given the
competitive incentives outlined above, it would also be wary of increasing
fees. Funds could raise fees if their performance warranted. But since
stewardship benefits competitors too, raising fees would potentially only
undermine their competitive position.
The calculus outlined above is true for all types of potential
engagements, including votes regarding environmental transparency. As
noted above, these potentially improve market returns by decreasing
climate-change risk. This risk affects all firms differently because each has a
different degree of exposure to it. It is only competitively advantageous to
decrease this risk if an asset managers’ funds are more exposed to climatechange risk than its competitors. If their funds are less exposed, then making

See Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1796-97.
See Lund, supra note 16, at 511.
146 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OMB. NO. 3235-0578, FORM N-Q.
147 See id. at 1.
144
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portfolio firms more environmentally conscious may actually hurt their
competitive position.
The bottom line is that because stewardship does not consistently
improve relative fund performance, and because investors are unable to
easily transfer their money to funds that improve their performance,
judicious participation in corporate governance is unlikely to lead to fund
inflows or higher fees.
***
Large asset managers have little, if any, financial incentive to engage
in stewardship. Careful voting is unlikely to boost profits or improve their
competitive position. It also risks important relationships with corporate
managers. The counterintuitive implication is that it a waste of their time
and money to try to use their voting power to increase the value of portfolio
firms. The empirical evidence suggests that the Big 3 and others have
reached this same conclusion.
D. Empirical Evidence of Asset-Manager Voting
Asset manager voting behavior suggests that stewardship is not
something they view as profitable. Neither their approach to voting nor how
they vote aligns with what firms would do if they were using stewardship to
reduce agency costs and thereby improve the performance of portfolio
firms.
1. The Stewardship Process
As noted previously, asset managers centralize the process for voting
their funds’ shares. A stewardship team makes voting recommendations to
the managers of each fund. Though usually not binding, it is rare for the
fund managers to vote otherwise.148 This is inconsistent with a profit motive.
If fund managers viewed stewardship as a way to increase returns, they
would want to handle it themselves rather than hand-off responsibility to a
team of bureaucrats.149 Moreover, if stewardship were profitable, asset
managers would want to capitalize on the knowledge spillover effects to
voting from stock research. Since it is the fund managers who have this
knowledge, centralizing voting negates this advantage. This again suggests
See note 78 and accompanying text.
In a move toward partial decentralization, Vanguard recently gave voting power to
external managers of its actively managed equity funds, which affects 9% of Vanguard’s
assets. See Lim & Lombardo, supra note 40.

148
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that asset managers are not using stewardship to generate profits. Similarly,
as noted above, because index funds cannot rearrange their portfolios to
improve performance, they may have the most to gain from stewardship. If
they viewed stewardship in this way, index-fund managers would be actively
involved with the stewardship process. Instead, they are absent.150
The size of the stewardship teams is also telling. For example,
Vanguard’s team is 35,151 BlackRock’s is 60.152 This is far too few people for
the vast number of votes these asset managers tally.153 BlackRock voted on
more than 165,000 management and shareholder proposals in the 2021
proxy season.154 There is no way this team is carefully weighing the merits of
each proposal. Vanguard reports that in 2021, its “Investment Stewardship
team engaged with 734 companies in 29 countries and voted on 137,826
proposals at 10,796 companies in the six months ended June 30, 2021.”155
Not a bad year for 35 people.
In addition, investment-management experience is not a prerequisite
to head the stewardship departments. The head of stewardship at Vanguard
was a staffer in President Obama’s administration.156 BlackRock’s is run by
a former senior official from the Bank of England.157 Moreover, the
stewardship teams do not report to the investment side of the asset manager.
They are part of the legal and compliance departments.158 This internal
structure suggests the teams are not there to vet proposals based on their
impact of portfolio value.
HORTENSE BIOY ET AL., PASSIVE FUND PROVIDERS TAKE AN ACTIVE APPROACH TO
INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP 14 (2017), https://www-prd.morningstar.com/content/dam
/marketing/shared/pdfs/Research/Morningstar-Passive-Active-Stewardship.pdf (“Index
portfolio managers … have no say in the voting of their portfolio holdings.”).
151 Vanguard Publishes 2020 Annual Investment Stewardship Report, VANGUARD (Sept. 15, 2020)
https://pressroom.vanguard.com/news/Press-Release-VG-2020-InvestmentStewardship-Annual-Report-Appointment-091520.html.
152 Dawn Lim, BlackRock Starts to Use Voting Power More Aggressively, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 30,
2021) https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrock-takes-aggressive-posture-on-esg-proxyvotes-11619775002?mod=article_inline.
153 See Bebchuk & Hirst, Future of Corporate Governance, supra note 9, at 2076-77 (discussing
the small size of the Big 3’s stewardship teams in relation to their holdings).
154 BLACKROCK, PURSUING LONG-TERM VALUE FOR OUR CLIENTS: BLACKROCK
INVESTMENT 15 (2021), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication
/2021-voting-spotlight-full-report.pdf.
155 VANGUARD, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP: 2021 SEMIANNUAL REPORT 3 (2021).
156 Lim & Baer, supra note 2.
157 BlackRock, Sandra Boss, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/biographies/sandyboss (last visited Nov. 29, 2021).
158 LATHAM & WATKINS, THE PARALLEL UNIVERSE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING AND
INSTITUTIONAL VOTING 3 (2010) (“The internal ‘corporate governance’ staff typically is
entirely separate from the portfolio managers and reports either to the general counsel or
senior compliance officer of the investment manager, not to the investing function.”).
150
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The way that the large asset managers approach voting reveals that
they see it as something separate and distinct from investing. It is an
orthogonal consideration—something they must do, but not something that
improves returns.159
2. The Three Eras of Asset-Manager Voting
The history of asset-manager voting also suggests that they do not
view it as a profitable undertaking. Their voting record can be divided into
three periods: the Governance Apathy Era; the Shareholder Rights Era; and
the Stakeholder Rights Era.
a. Governance Apathy Era (1929 – 2003)
The asset-management industry has a long history of sleepy
stewardship. For the first 75 years of their existence, their votes were not
publicly disclosed, so it is difficult to definitively know the extent to which
they participated in corporate governance. But the consensus is that they did
not take it seriously during this period.160 In a 1980 report to Congress, the
SEC wrote that asset managers do not historically seek change through
stewardship but instead sell when displeased with management.161 Despite a
few exceptions, the same proved true through the 1990s.162 Notably,
Vanguard did not establish a stewardship team until 2001.163 In advancing
voting regulations two years later, the SEC cited the industry’s history of

See id. at 4 (“The voting decision makers—the corporate governance officers at
institutional investors and their counterparts at proxy advisory firms—function in the
universe of corporate governance, a universe that may be analogized to a separate, parallel
universe from that of the investment decision makers.”)
160 See, e.g., James Cotter et al., ISS Recommendations and Mutual Fund Voting, 55 VILL. L. REV.
1, 2 (2010) (“[M]utual funds historically followed the ‘Wall Street rule,’ selling their shares
in underperforming portfolio companies rather than engaging in shareholder activism.”);
Roe, supra note 112, at 1469 (“despite their size, mutual funds rarely participate in corporate
governance”); Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered
Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6565 & n.14 (Feb. 7, 2003)
(“Traditionally, mutual funds have been viewed as largely passive investors, reluctant to
challenge corporate management on issues such as corporate governance.”).
161 DIV. OF CORP. FIN., SEC. & EXCH. COMM., STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY 339 (Sept. 4, 1980).
162 Roe, supra note 112, at 1469.
163 Vanguard Publishes 2020 Annual Investment Stewardship Report, supra note 151.
159
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corporate-governance complacency as a rationale for intervention.164 For 75
years, neither asset managers nor regulators paid much attention to voting.
b. Shareholder Rights Era (2003 – 2020)
In the early 2000s, Enron’s collapse, along with a series of other
financial scandals, led to a federal regulatory focus on corporate governance,
which culminated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.165 Although asset
managers escaped direct regulation under Sarbanes-Oxley, mutual-fund
voting entered the regulatory gaze. In 2003, the SEC finalized rules that
required asset managers to “adopt and implement policies and procedures
for voting proxies in the best interest of clients, to describe the procedures
to clients, and to tell clients how they may obtain information about how
the [asset manager] has actually voted their proxies.”166 The agency also
affirmed that asset managers had a fiduciary duty to vote shares in the “best
interest” of fund shareholders and required, as an implication thereof, that
they vote the shares under their control.167 Related rulemaking required that
mutual funds report annually how they vote on a new form, Form N-PX.168
The impetus for these rules was two-fold. First, as just noted, asset
managers were not taking their stewardship obligations seriously. The SEC
blamed it on conflicts of interest with their 401(k) administration businesses
and other connections with portfolio companies.169 Second, the SEC
reasoned that transparency and other regulatory measures would encourage
asset managers to become better stewards, which to the SEC meant that they
would police management at portfolio firms to maximize shareholder
value.170 Corporate-governance failures were the chief policy concerns of the
era, and pushing asset managers to more actively oversee portfolio
companies was viewed as one more way to address these concerns.
The reforms worked, in part. Asset managers reacted by engaging
proxy advisory firms to assist in their voting. In the beginning, they heavily
relied on their advice,171 and these firms were largely antagonistic toward
See 68 Fed. Reg. at 6566 (“[R]equiring greater transparency of proxy voting by funds may
encourage funds to become more engaged in corporate governance of issuers held in their
portfolios...”).
165 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
166 See Proxy Voting by Investment Advisors, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585, 6586 (Feb. 7, 2003).
167 Id.
168 See 17 C.F.R. § 274.129 (2020); 68 Fed. Reg. at 6569.
169 See 68 Fed. Reg. at 6586.
170 68 Fed. Reg. at 6566 (“Proxy voting decisions by funds can play an important role in
maximizing the value of the funds’ investments, thereby having an enormous impact on the
financial livelihood of millions of Americans.”).
171 See Cotter et al., supra note 160, at 55.
164
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management. They encouraged asset managers to support things like
destaggered boards and majority voting in director elections, and they
abided.172 As the influence and power of proxy advisors drew regulatory
scrutiny,173 asset managers began to grow their in-house stewardship
departments,174 which continued to support measures that empowered
shareholders and limited the discretion of managers and board members.175
During this time, however, asset managers never became activists.
They never launched proxy contests or nominated directors.176 Their role
was, and has remained, reactive. In addition, during this period, they mostly
only supported measures related to the rules of corporate governance. They
almost never voted against executive compensation packages or for politicalspending disclosures.177 They also rarely supported environmental or social
proposals during this period.178 BlackRock has drawn the most scrutiny for
its voting record. Its CEO, Larry Fink, has been outspoken about his view
that companies should be run for the benefit of all stakeholders, not just
shareholders.179 But BlackRock infrequently supported measures consistent
with this view. 180

See id.
See generally Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, 75 Fed. Reg. 42989, 43011 (July
22, 2010); Sec. & Exch. Comm., Proxy Voting: Proxy Voting Responsibilities of Investment
Advisers and Availability of Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Advisory Firms,
Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20 (IM/CF), June 30, 2014; Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for
Proxy Voting Advice, 85 Fed. Reg. 55082 (Sept. 3, 2020).
174 See BIOY ET AL., supra note 150, at 19.
175 See Bubb & Catan, supra note 79, at 68 fig. 15 (showing fund support for a range of
shareholder and management proposals).
176 See Bebchuk & Hirst, Future of Corporate Governance, supra note 9, at 2095-2101.
177 See Gretchen Morgensen, Your Mutual Fund Has Your Proxy, Like It or Not, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/25/business/your-mutual-fund-hasyour-proxy-like-it-or-not.html.
178 See Bubb & Catan, supra note 79, at 68 fig. 15 (showing low support for social proposals
among members of the Traditional Governance Party); Caleb Griffin, Environmental & Social
Voting at Index Funds, 44 DEL. J. CORP. L. 167, 211-12 (2021) (finding Big 3 support for such
proposals at between 7.1% and 22.7% during the 2018-2019 proxy year).
179 See Letter from Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, Inc., to CEOs (Jan. 18, 2022),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter.
180 See, e.g., Brian Schatz, U.S. Senator for Hawaii, Schatz, Senators Demand That BlackRock
Live Up to Its Public Commitment to Climate Action (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.
schatz.senate.gov/press-releases/schatz-senators-demand-that-blackrock-live-up-to-itspublic-commitment-to-climate-action.
172
173
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c. Stakeholder Rights Era (Beginning in 2021)
In the 2021 proxy season, the large asset managers dramatically
changed their stance on environmental and social matters.181 The reversal is
stunning. In 2020, BlackRock voted for 6% of environmental proposals.182
This was a drop from 8% the previous year.183 In 2021, the firm supported
64%.184 Vanguard voted for 22% of environmental proposals in 2020 and
46% in 2021.185
Voting on social matters follows the same trend. BlackRock’s
support rose from 11.5% in 2020 to 44.3% in 2021 and Vanguard’s from
15% to 29.6% over that same period.186 BlackRock’s support for diversityrelated proposals shot from 13.6% to 68.2%.187 Even State Street, which
emphasizes its commitment to environmental and social matters, increased
its support: from 48.6% in 2020 to 56.8% in 2021 for environmental
proposals and 25% to 35.6% for social proposals.188
Leading voting analytics firms noticed the change. Surveying the
evidence, Morningstar noted “a discernible shift in the voting stance of the
largest institutional holders of U.S. public equities.”189 Because of the
increased support for environmental and social issues, Insightia called the
2021 proxy season “revolutionary.”190

See Lim, supra note 152.
See Mooney, supra note 29.
183 Id. In 2019, Vanguard and BlackRock voted against all of the shareholder proposals
supported by an influential climate organization, Climate Action 100+. See Eric Rosenbaum,
Activists Thought BlackRock, Vanguard Found Religion on Climate Change. Not Anymore, CNBC
(Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/13/blackrock-vanguard-found-religionon-climate-doubts-are-growing.html. In 2020, they voted against 10 out of 12 that Climate
Action considered key votes. See Schatz, supra note 180.
184 Lim & Baer, supra note 2.
185 INSIGHTIA, PROXY VOTING SEASON SNAPSHOT 2021, at 12.
186 Id. at 17.
187 Largest Asset Manager Support for Shareholder Votes on Climate and Diversity Rise Sharply, INST.
ASSET MANAGER (Sept. 22, 2021), https://www.institutionalassetmanager.co.uk/2021/
09/22/306563/largest-asset-managers-support-shareholder-votes-climate-and-diversityrises.
188 INSIGHTIA, supra note 185, at 12, 17.
189 Jackie Cooke & Lauren Solberg, The 2021 Voting Season in 7 Charts, MORNINGSTAR (Aug.
5, 2021), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/1052234/the-2021-proxy-voting-seasonin-7-charts.
190 INSIGHTIA, supra note 72, at 1.
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d. The Three Eras and the Profitability of Stewardship
This history is inconsistent with a profit motivation. If asset
managers found stewardship profitable, they would have participated in it
since the industry’s inception. Instead, they avoided it until regulators
prodded them to take voting more seriously.
The regulatory intervention triggered the shareholder rights era,
where asset managers mostly supported proposals that increased
shareholder power. As noted above, these measures may help in
circumstances where management is underperforming, but are detrimental
if management is competent and creative.191 That being the case, if asset
managers were looking to these measures to improve performance at
portfolio firms, they would be selective about which ones they support.
Instead, they supported measures that matched their “governance
principles” regardless of the firm.192
In addition, profits cannot explain the sudden support for social and
environmental matters. As noted above, their tie to firm profits is
speculative.193 And even if these measures are profitable, why the sudden
embrace?
Finally, a Reuters study that looked at the extent to which the Big 3
voted with management showed that there was little difference in their level
of support at poorly performing companies.194 This again suggests they are
not policing their firms for performance improvements.
***
Theory and evidence line up behind the conclusion that stewardship
is not profitable for large asset managers. If the Big 3 and others believed
engaged voting was profitable, they would vote enthusiastically, there would
be a pattern of targeting underperformers, and finance professionals would
be heavily involved in the process. In contrast, the asset-management
industry had to be forced to engage in stewardship and asset managers have
delegated the task to centralized compliance-oriented teams.

See supra text accompanying note 129.
See Bebchuk & Hirst, Future of Corporate Governance, supra note 9, at 2089-90.
193 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
194 Tim McLaughlin & Ross Kerber, Index Funds Invest Trillions But Rarely Challenge
Management, REUTERS (Oct. 8, 2019) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-funds-indexspecialreports-idUSKBN1WN107 (The Big 3 “supported management at the worstperforming Russell 3000 firms only slightly less often than they did for all companies in the
index, regardless of performance.”).
191
192
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Others troubled by asset-manager stewardship jump directly to
reform proposals.195 But doing so bypasses the most important implication
of the foregoing analysis. Hugely influential financial institutions are casting
millions of votes every year, votes that chart the trajectory of the world’s
most important companies, but they are not using their power to increase
the value of the firms they own. Their motivation is unknown.
This ignorance of what motivates voting at the large asset managers
is a significant gap in corporate- and securities-law scholarship. It is
impossible to evaluate whether their stewardship practices pose societal risk
or to assess reform proposals without an understanding of what drives their
engagement in corporate governance.
III. STEWARDSHIP THEATER
Since stewardship is unprofitable, something else must drive assetmanager voting. While no one thing can fully explain how the large asset
managers vote, there is good reason to believe that political considerations
are front of mind.
A. A Political Theory of Asset-Manager Voting
All large companies are political actors. Their direct engagement in
politics is much discussed. They back candidates with political
contributions.196 Industries employ thousands of lobbyists to argue for their
interests on specific bills.197 The legitimacy of these activities has long been
a source of concern.198
But companies might also conduct their business in ways to
advantage themselves politically. This aspect of political engagement has
gone almost unrecognized. Doing so, can provide two types of benefits.
First, politically motivated actions might forestall regulations. If regulators
are signaling that a business may face new forms of regulation, it might
change its behavior to cool down the chatter. Just to give a few likely
examples: when faced with controversy over its treatment of drivers, Uber
See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, Future of Corporate Governance, supra note 9, at 2116-2131; Lund,
supra note 16, at 523-33.
196 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010); see generally Ciara
Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending: Giving Shareholders a Voice, BRENNAN CENTER
FOR JUSTICE (2010), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report
_Corporate-Campaign-Spending-Giving-Shareholders-Voice.pdf. The total amount of
political spending is unknown. Id. at 10.
197 See Lee Fang, Where Have All the Lobbyists Gone, NATION (Feb. 19, 2014),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/shadow-lobbying-complex/.
198 See generally, e.g., Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 196.
195
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began subsidizing employee health-care coverage;199 when faced with
increasing scrutiny about environmental risks and impacts, companies began
producing sustainability reports;200 when faced with a backlash over its role
in spreading misinformation, Facebook set up an oversight board.201 While
there may be plausible business cases for these efforts, it is hard to deny that
avoiding regulation was likely a key driver.
Second, conducting business in a manner that pleases government
officials provides reputational benefits. It is a way for a company, or even an
entire industry, to develop good standing with regulators. This paves the way
for more lenient oversight over existing or new lines of business. It can also
reduce the likelihood of regulatory enforcement actions.
This understanding of business motives is different from—even the
opposite of—the typical view. The default is to assume that companies push
legal boundaries and dare regulators to respond. And this is often the case.
Uber ignored taxicab regulations and AirBnB ignored hotel laws—to great
success.202 The extent to which companies engage in politically motivated
behavior depends on the industry and activity in question. Companies in
more highly regulated industries would be more attuned to the political
consequences of their actions. They would be more reliant on good relations
with regulators, and political sensitivity would steep into their culture.
Companies would also be more likely to mollify rather than push regulators
when there is a credible threat of new rules, those rules would impose
significant costs, and where satisfying regulators would not significantly hurt
their business.
All of these considerations suggest that the large asset managers use
stewardship to advance political goals. As discussed above, since there is no
profit incentive to vote a certain way, it is cost-free for asset managers to use
their power for political ends. As discussed below, there is a credible threat
of costly voting regulations that asset managers undoubtedly wish to avert.
They are also one of the most highly regulated and highly political industries

See Anna Cooban, Uber Said it Would Help Pay Drivers’ Healthcare–Then Withdrew the Offer 2
Weeks Later, Calling it a Mistake, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 11, 2021), https:/www.businessin
sider.com/uber-driver-health-insurance-offer-mistake-california-2021-6.
200 See 90% of S&P 500 Index Companies Publish Sustainability Reports in 2019, GOVERNANCE
& ACCOUNTABILITY INST. (July 16, 2020), https://www.globenewswire.com/newsrelease/2020/07/16/2063434/0/en/90-of-S-P-500-Index-Companies-Publish-Sustainab
ility-Reports-in-2019-G-A-Announces-in-its-Latest-Annual-2020-Flash-Report.html
(detailing the rise in sustainability reporting).
201 See Kate Klonick, The Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent Institution to
Adjudicate Online Free Expression, 129 YALE L.J. 2418, 2488 (2020).
202 See Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 U.S.C. L. REV.
383, 386, 389 (2017).
199
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in the U.S. The evidence of both how they vote and how they approach
voting also suggests a political motivation.
1. The Threat of Regulation
The Big 3 face greater political and regulatory uncertainty now than
they have in decades. A chorus of commentators view them as a threat to
financial-market stability, competition, and shareholder democracy.
Many worry that the increasing role of indexing is undermining
share-price accuracy, considered the core of financial markets.203 As noted
earlier, an article in the Atlantic asked whether indexing is worse than
Marxism.204 The substance of the analogy was that, at least in a centrally
planned economy, apparatchiks try to efficiently allocate resources, but
index funds do so without any regard to quality.205 The concern is that, since
indexing does not involve stock-picking, stock prices are unmoored from
fundamental value.206
Antitrust scholars have focused on “horizontal shareholdings.”207
The concern here is that because large asset managers own shares in
competing firms (i.e., horizontal shareholdings), they will not push the firms
to fiercely compete, which would only serve to hurt the industry’s
profitability.208 The result is reduced competition and increased prices.
Emerging empirical evidence tends to support this fear.209 For example, a
controversial study showed that horizontal shareholdings in airlines raised
ticket prices three to seven percent.210 No one specifically alleges
anticompetitive behavior,211 but the effect can materialize without any

See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See Lowrey, supra note 20.
205 Id.
206 See id; Coates, supra note 1, at 19-20 (“Indexation may have blunted price signals.”).
207 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
208
For a useful further explanation of the problem, see Jacob Greenspon, How Big a Problem
Is It That a Few Shareholders Own Stock in So Many Competing Companies?, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Feb. 19, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/02/how-big-a-problem-is-it-that-a-few-sharehold
ers-own-stock-in-so-many-competing-companies.
209 See Azar et al., supra note 21, at 54 (showing higher prices in the airline industry); Melissa
Newham et al., Common Ownership and Market Entry: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Industry 38
(DIW Berlin Discussion Paper No. 1738, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=3194394 (showing higher prices in the pharmaceutical industry); Jose
Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition (May 4, 2019) https://ssrn.com
/abstract=2710252 (showing higher banking fees).
210 See Azar et al., supra note 21, at 54.
211 See Morley, supra note 121, at 1410 n.17.
203
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coordination. Understanding these incentives, executives might simply fail
to compete on price.212
The final concerns relate directly to stewardship. They fall into
roughly three categories. The first stems from a general unease about the
concentration of wealth and power in the hands of the large asset managers.
Government has always been wary of financial institutions exerting outsized
control over the firms they own. As discussed further below, this was a key
impetus for the New-Deal-Era regulations that still govern the assetmanagement industry today.213 Professor John Coates gives voice to the
modern-day version of this worry. He argues that soon about 12 people (the
heads of the large asset managers) will likely have “practical power over the
majority of U.S. companies.”214 This prospect, he argues, “poses a legitimacy
and accountability issue of the first order.”215 In a similar vein, the recently
deceased founder of Vanguard, John Bogle, argued that the concentration
of voting is “not in the national interest.”216
A more tangible concern is that asset managers are not representing
the interests of the mutual-fund shareholders. As noted above, asset
managers only internalize a small percentage of any gain from stewardship.
Their investors gain the rest. Because the manager gains only a small share,
scholars are concerned that they are not as vigilant as their investors would
like.217 Investors also have a range of views on ES proposals. Whichever way
the large asset managers vote offends the views of a large portion of its
investors.
The final concern is substantive—that large asset managers are not
voting the way that commentators and regulators would like. The Big 3 have
received a great deal of reproach for their failure to back environmental
shareholder proposals.218 Before BlackRock began broadly supporting
environmental proposals in 2021, it had attracted condemnation from
Democrat Senators and Congresspersons for its voting record.219 Five
See Einer Elhauge, The Causal Mechanisms of Horizontal Shareholding, 82 OHIO S. L.J. 1, 2223 (2021).
213 See Roe, supra note 112, at 1471.
214 See Coates, supra note 1, at 1.
215 Id. at 2, 19.
216 See John C. Bogle, Bogle Sounds a Warning on Index Funds, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bogle-sounds-a-warning-on-index-funds-1543504551.
217 See Bebchuk & Hirst, Future of Corporate Governance, supra note 9, at 2037.
218 See, e.g., Patrick Greenwell, World’s Top Three Asset Managers Oversee $300bn Fossil Fuel
Investments, GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019
/oct/12/top-three-asset-managers-fossil-fuel-investments (“The two largest asset
managers, BlackRock and Vanguard, have also routinely opposed motions at fossil fuel
companies that would have forced directors to take more action on climate change.”).
219 See Schatz, supra note 180; Letter from Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator, to Larry Fink,
BlackRock Co. CEO (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc
212
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Democratic Senators wrote a letter chiding BlackRock: “You lag all of your
peers in exercising your fiduciary responsibility to make companies account
for their contributions—and exposure—to climate risks. Considering your
goal of incorporating climate risks into BlackRock’s investment stewardship,
this proxy voting record is troubling and inconsistent.”220 Senator Warren
signed the letter and penned her own expressing similar sentiments with four
other Democrat Senators.221 Pressure on climate-related issues is also
coming directly from the Biden administration.222
Now that the Big 3 have reversed their position, a different group of
politicians are upset.223 A group of Republicans sent a letter expressing their
concern that BlackRock and State Street are “increasingly incorporating leftleaning environmental, social and corporate governance” priorities into their
proxy voting.224 They argue that this shift reflects their personal views rather
than those of their shareholders’.225 As ES issues have come to the forefront
of corporate governance, politics and corporate governance have converged.
Concerns about how the Big 3 vote come not only from nonprofits,
journalists, and academics, but also from politicians who wish to push asset
managers to support their party’s policy agenda and ideology.
This array of concerns has generated a blizzard of reform proposals.
There are calls to break up the Big 3,226 limit the extent to which they can
invest in multiple companies in the same industry,227 take away or cap their
voting rights,228 require shareholder input for voting,229 mandate stewardship

/2.25.2020%20-%20Letter%20from%20Sens.%20Warren%20Whitehouse%20Booker
%20%20Van%20Hollen%20to%20Larry%20Fink%20BlackRock.pdf.
220 Schatz, supra note 180.
221 See Warren, supra note 219.
222 See Dawn Lim, Republicans Ask Federal Retirement Plan for Details on BlackRock, StateStreet’s
Votes, WALL ST. J. (July 1, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/republicansask-federalretirement-planfor-details-on-blackrock-state-streets-votes-11625139430 (“The Biden
administration is … pressing money managers to be more attentive to climate risks”);
Climate-Related Financial Risk, Proclamation No. 14030, 86 Fed. Reg. 27,967 (May 25,
2021) (addressing “the failure of financial institutions to appropriately and adequately
account for” climate risk).
223 See Lim, supra note 222.
224 Id.
225 See id.
226 See Bebchuk & Hirst, Future of Corporate Governance, supra note 9, at 2129; Goshen & Levit,
supra note 25, at 11; Graham Steele, The New Money Trust: How Large Money Managers Control
Our Economy and What We Can Do About It, AMERICAN ECONOMIC LIBERTIES PROJECT
(Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.economicliberties.us/our-work/new-money-trust/.
227 See Posner et al., supra note 21, at 670.
228 See Caleb Griffin, We Three Kings: Disintermediating Voting at the Index Fund Giants, 79 MD.
L. REV. 954, 983 (2020); Lund, supra note 16, at 528.
229 See Griffin, supra note 228, at 992-94.
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expenditures,230 force divestiture of their 401(k) businesses,231 impose
stewardship codes,232 and mandate procedures for decentralized fund-level
voting.233 The Big 3 are constantly defending themselves against these
proposals and the related critiques.234
As the direct attacks from politicians illustrate, concerns about the
asset-management industry stretch beyond academic handwringing. In late
2020, the Federal Trade Commission (the “FTC”) proposed rules that would
increase reporting obligations in connection with horizontal
shareholdings.235 And regulators have signaled out the finance industry and
asset managers for special antitrust scrutiny.236
The SEC is also highly attuned to the issue. At an FTC hearing on
horizontal shareholdings, former SEC Commissioner Jackson referred to
the set of challenges posed by horizontal shareholdings as “the investor
protection challenge of the 21st century.”237 In March 2021, SEC
Commissioner Lee gave a speech on problems with asset-manager voting to
the Investment Company Institute (the “ICI”), the industry’s lobbying
association, at its annual conference.238 The ICI did not hold the conference
in 2020, but in 2019, Commissioner Roisman made similar comments.239
See Bebchuk & Hirst, Future of Corporate Governance, supra note 9, at 2121.
See id. at 2122-23.
232 See Coates, supra note 1, 20-21.
233 See Ann Lipton, Family Loyalty: Mutual Fund Voting and Fiduciary Obligations, 19
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 176, 200 (2017).
234 See Matt Egan, BlackRock and the $15 Trillion Fund Industry Should be Broken Up, Antimonopoly
Group Says, CNN (Nov. 24, 2020), https://edition.cnn.com/2020/11/24/business/black
rock-vanguard-state-street-biden/index.html (“We fundamentally disagree with the
conclusions in this paper and its recommendations, which we believe would do harm to
investors,” quoting State Street responding to a critic); Paul Schott Stevens, SEC Should
Reject Complex, Costly “Pass-Through” Proxy Voting, INVEST. CO. INST. (Oct. 2, 2018),
https://www.ici.org/viewpoints/view_18_passthrough_voting; Dawn Lim, supra note 222;
Novick, supra note 9 (response to Bebchuk and Hirst’s critique); Mallow, supra note 9 (same).
235 See generally Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements, 85 Fed.
Reg. 77042 (Dec. 1, 2020).
236 See David Mclaughlin & Annie Massa, Antitrust Regulators Ask Whether Index Funds Deserve
More Scrutiny, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 20, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2020-12-17/index-funds-antitrust-regulators-weigh-whether-they-deserve-more-scrutiny;
see generally Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy, 86 Fed.
Reg. 36987 (July 14, 2021).
237 See Jackson, supra note 1, at, at 1.
238 See Allison Herren Lee, Acting Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm., 2021 ICI Mutual Funds and
Investment Management Conference: Every Vote Counts: The Importance of Fund Voting
and Disclosure (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/lee-every-votecounts#_ftnref12.
239 See Elad L. Roisman, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm., Keynote Remarks: ICI
Mutual Funds and Investment Management Conference (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.sec.
gov/news/speech/speech-roisman-031819.
230
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Two years earlier, then-SEC-Chairman Clayton remarked, “Often voting
power rests in the hands of [asset managers] who owe a duty to vote proxies
in a manner consistent with the best interests of the fund and its
shareholders. A question I have is: are voting decisions maximizing the
funds’ value for those shareholders?”240
The SEC is also making regulatory moves. In 2019, the agency
revised guidance to asset managers on the proper exercise of their proxy
obligations;241 then supplemented them just two years later.242 The new
guidelines focus on clarifying asset managers’ fiduciary duties with respect
to proxy voting and how they relate to the use of proxy advisors.243 In 2021,
the SEC Division of Examinations issued a “Risk Alert” in which it
expressed concern about “inconsistencies between public ESG-related
proxy voting claims and internal proxy voting policies and practices.”244
Months later, the agency issued proposed rules to amend Form NP-X to
render disclosures of proxy voting more accessible.245 In the proposing
release, the agency expressed concerns that asset managers were not diligent
enough, not voting in their investors’ best interests, and influenced by
conflicts of interest.246
The regulatory proposals so far chip at the edges of asset-manager
stewardship, but illustrate that proxy voting is top of mind at both the FTC
and the SEC. Congressional involvement also threatens. All of this means
that voting, and the associated influence over corporate affairs, is the issue
confronting the asset-management industry.
The calculation for large asset managers is clear, even inevitable.
There is no financial gain from stewardship. But there are tremendous
political stakes. They should exercise their voting power to please politicians
and regulators rather than police underperforming companies. While some
See Jay Clayton, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm., Remarks at the PLI 49th Ann. Inst. on
Securities Regulation—New York, N.Y.: Governance and Transparency at the Commission
and in Our Markets (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-clayton2017-11-08.
241 See generally Commission Guidance Regarding Proxy Voting Responsibilities of
Investment Advisers, 84 Fed. Reg. 47420 (Sept. 10, 2019).
242 Supplement to Commission Guidance Regarding Proxy Voting Responsibilities of
Investment Advisers, 85 Fed. Reg. 55155 (Sept. 3, 2020), https://www.govinfo.gov/cont
ent/pkg/FR-2020-09-03/pdf/2020-16338.pdf.
243 See id. at 55155. On the same day as the supplement, the SEC released new rules for
proxy advisors. See Exemption from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice, 85 Fed. Reg.
55,082 (Sept. 3, 2020).
244 Sec. & Exch. Comm., ESG Risk Alert, SEC Div. of Examinations 4 (Apr. 9, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/files/esg-risk-alert.pdf.
245 See generally Enhanced Reporting of Proxy Votes by Management Investment Companies,
86 Fed. Reg. 57,478 (Oct. 15, 2021).
246 See id. at 57503.
240
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industries or firms might resist the political pull, the unique history of asset
management makes politically motivated stewardship an easy choice.
2. The Political History of the Asset-Management Industry
An institutional and historical understanding of the assetmanagement industry buttresses the theoretical case for why they are likely
to view stewardship through a political lens. While economic incentives are
key drivers of institutional behavior, history and culture also guide corporate
decisions.247 Thus, a deeper institutional understanding of asset managers
allows for a far more complete picture of how they are likely to approach
stewardship.
Since its inception, the industry has been highly political. Regulations
launched the industry and inform almost every aspect of its operations.
Throughout its history, asset managers have shaped these regulations, and
worked hard to cultivate a close relationship with regulators and a clean
image. This high sensitivity to politics suggests they will naturally view
stewardship as a way to advance political goals.
Today’s asset-management industry is a product of two New-Dealera regulations: The Revenue Act of 1936 and the Investment Company Act
of 1940. Before these statutes, asset managers and the mutual funds they
oversaw were small players on the periphery of financial markets.248
a. The Revenue Act of 1936
Asset managers launched the first U.S. mutual funds in 1924.249 And
only a decade later, it was unclear if mutual funds would survive. At their
inception, they benefited from pass-through tax treatment. Fund
shareholders paid taxes on dividends, but funds themselves did not.250 In
1935, however, President Roosevelt proposed taxing “intercorporate”
dividends.251 This would have meant that mutual funds would be subject to
their own level of tax. It would have been triple taxation—at the corporate
level, the fund level, and the shareholder level. This would have killed the

See Roe, supra note 112, at 1508 (“[C]orporate culture and history cannot be so easily
reversed.”).
248 See id. at 1490; MATTHEW P. FINK, THE RISE OF MUTUAL FUNDS: AN INSIDER’S VIEW
53 (2nd ed. 2011) (“[M]utual funds at this time were still viewed as the stepchild of the
investment company industry”).
249 FINK, supra note 248, at 10.
250 See id. at 26.
251 Id.
247
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mutual-fund business.252 In announcing the plan, though, Roosevelt left the
door open to leave mutual funds untaxed if they submitted to “public
regulation.”253
The public regulation came in the Revenue Act of 1936 (the “36
254
Act”). The Act permitted mutual funds to maintain pass-through taxation
so long as they invested no more than 5% of their assets in any company
and held no more than 10% of a single portfolio company’s outstanding
stock.255 Even though this is tax legislation, there appears to be no tie
between these portfolio-fragmentation requirements and tax policy.
The rationale seems to be to ensure that mutual funds are diversified,
which regulators at the time saw as their only legitimate function.256 But this
policy justification is also likely incomplete. Only the former limitation—the
5% cap—can be defended on diversification grounds. The rule that limits
ownership to 10% of any firm is only loosely tied to this goal. A large fund
can own far more than 10% of a single small firm and still be diversified.257
Instead, Professor Mark Roe argues persuasively that these
limitations were not primarily about diversification; rather they were about
preventing managers of mutual funds from exerting control over portfolio
firms.258 Concentrated large holdings make intervention profitable, but the
former limitation means that a fund cannot concentrate its holdings in any
one company, and the latter means that a fund cannot own anything
approaching a controlling interest.
Preventing financial institutions from having a large influence over
their portfolio companies was part of the period’s zeitgeist. Policymakers at
the time blamed the stock market crash on the outsized role that the banking
industry played in the governance of public companies.259 Though mutualfund holdings were small, and only a few managers had started to take any
interest in corporate governance, legislators saw regulation as a way to
prevent future interference and send a signal that such control was not to be
tolerated. 260

See FINK, supra note 248, at 29 (“[W]ithout such tax treatment, it is doubtful that mutual
funds would have continued to exist, much less flourish.”); Roe, supra note 112, at 1510
(“Without tax exemption, the funds could not survive.”).
253 FINK, supra note 248, at 26.
254 Pub. L. No. 74-740, 49 Stat. 1648 (1936).
255 See Pub. L. No. 74-740, 49 Stat. 1648, 1669, 26 U.S.C. § 851 (2020).
256 Roe, supra note 112, at 1488 (“The SEC testified that a mutual fund’s only positive
function was to provide diversification; any extension risked thievery.”).
257 See Roe, supra note 112, at 1475.
258 Id. at 1501.
259 See id. at 1486.
260 See id. at 1490.
252
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The chief concern was that asset managers would use their
concentrated power to advance their own interests. A senate report went so
far as to allege that asset-manager control over portfolio firms was
improper.261 According to Professor Roe, regulators were worried that they
“might pump money into the portfolio company to protect a large position,
unwisely change the portfolio company's financial policy or capital structure,
force dividends out from the portfolio company at too high a rate, or force
a merger on terms disadvantageous to the outside shareholders of the
controlled company.”262 Similar suspicions about competence and
impropriety echo today.
This historical perspective offers important insights into this
Article’s argument. It supports the conclusion reached above—that asset
managers have little reason to care about stewardship—and suggests that
their indifference is the product of politics and regulatory design. Today
some worry that asset managers are not involved enough in corporate
governance. But when mutual funds were first regulated, Congress’s most
important concern was keeping fund managers out of corporate affairs.
Also telling is that the asset-management industry was untroubled by
limitations on corporate control. As has become a pattern in mutual-fund
regulation, the 36 Act resulted from cooperation with industry. The so-called
“conduit” theory—the idea that mutual funds are just a conduit for investors
to invest in public companies and therefore entitled to pass-through tax
treatment—was proposed by the industry in a meeting with President
Roosevelt.263 They also strongly lobbied for the 36 Act.264 Thus, asset
managers were voluntarily subjected to this limitation on their ability to
impact portfolio companies, suggesting that, even from the beginning, they
saw stewardship as unprofitable.
b. Investment Company Act of 1940
The Investment Company Act (the “ICA”) followed four years later.
From a public policy perspective, the ICA is a puzzle. It is a lengthy and
detailed statute, which sets out exactly how mutual funds must be run.265
This is a departure from other aspects of securities regulation, which
typically mandate disclosure but do not interfere with operations. The scope
See id. at 1472.
Id. at 1473.
263 See FINK, supra note 248, at 27-28.
264 See Roe, supra note 112, at 1499.
265 See FINK, supra note 248, at 46 (describing the ICA as an “extremely detailed statue that
laid down a series of very specific do’s and don’ts”); Coates, supra note 1, at 8 (describing
ICA as “the most stringent set of controls on any financial subsector”).
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of the ICA also cannot be explained as a comprehensive response to
widespread abuse. Mutual-fund managers had not been accused of serious
impropriety.266 Mutual funds were thought to be overleveraged,267 which was
addressed through a provision that significantly limited their ability to
borrow,268 but there were no allegations of egregious misconduct.
Like the 36 Act, the ICA addressed prospective concerns about
asset-manager involvement in corporate governance. The ICA rules require
that for funds to call themselves “diversified,” they must meet the same
requirements specified in the 36 Act for pass-through taxation. Namely, they
cannot own more than 10% of a company’s stock and they cannot have
more than 5% of the fund’s portfolio in any one security.269 To reinforce
these rules, the ICA also prohibits mutual funds from banding together to
influence management.270
As with the 36 Act, the industry was heavily involved in the
legislative process. They opposed, and in response the SEC removed,
significant limitations. For instance, the SEC wanted a fund cap of $150
million271 and a limitation on the number of funds overseen by a single asset
manager.272 Both died in the face of industry opposition.273
Industry also introduced, and the SEC accepted, highly unusual price
controls. Under the ICA, mutual-fund shares can only be sold at the price
in the fund’s federally mandated offering document, the prospectus.274 This
sort of resale price maintenance is typically seen as anticompetitive.
Once asset managers got what they wanted, they strongly supported
the legislation and worked aggressively for its enactment.275 Despite its
length and complexity, the final legislation did little to alter industry
practices. In fact, the new rules essentially mandated that all firms operate
how the largest asset manager, Massachusetts Investment Trust, already
functioned.276
The weak grounds for extensive regulation, along with the industry’s
strong support, suggests that an interest-group lens provides a compelling
See FINK, supra note 248, at 44 (Industry “problems were fund shares trading at
substantial premiums over actual portfolio values, excessive use of leverage through
borrowing, and securities firms dumping securities into funds they managed.”).
267 See id.
268 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(a) (2020).
269 See id. at § 80a-5(b)(1).
270 See id. at § 80a-17(d).
271 Roe, supra note 112, at 1473.
272 See FINK, supra note 248, at 40.
273 See id. at 40-42; Roe, supra note 112, at 1473-74.
274 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d); FINK, supra note 248, at 43; Roe, supra note 112, at 1489.
275 See FINK, 33-34, 36 (discussing “strong industry support” for the ICA).
276 See id. at 34.
266
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explanation for the ICA.277 The asset-management industry pushed through
a statute that provided credibility to mutual funds at little expense to insiders
but at great expense to possible new entrants. As a 1941 Georgetown Law
Review article observed, “The existing big companies have legal departments
quite capable of handling the situation; but on careful consideration one
wonders if new men would take one look at the voluminous statute, teeming
with hundred-word sentences, and then call the whole thing off.”278
Perhaps because of the additional credibility that accompanied the
new regulatory tome, mutual funds expanded greatly after the ICA.279 In
1959, Time magazine referred to them as “the fastestgrowing…phenomenon of the U.S. financial world.”280 Mutual-fund assets
in 1965 were 38-times their size in 1940.281
Unlike other businesses, which exist within a regulatory framework
that sets outside boundaries on behavior, mutual funds survive because of
favorable tax treatment and operate wholly pursuant to detailed regulatory
instructions, which the asset managers that oversee them were actively
involved in drafting. Regulation, along with participation in the regulatory
process, is a central part of the history of mutual funds and asset
management.
c. The Ongoing Political Nature of the Industry
The asset-management industry has continued to work closely with
regulators. The ICI, which was founded in 1940 to “assist … SEC officials
in the effective regulation” of mutual funds,282 is an aggressive and powerful
lobbyist.283 The industry’s political savvy has helped mutual funds avoid
important regulatory initiatives and major financial reforms. For example,
the Mutual Fund Fee and Transparency Act of 2003 would have called upon
mutual funds to, among other things, report the fees they charge investors
in shareholder account statements284—a simple and direct way to protect
See generally Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing Investment Management Regulation, 16 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 521, 550 (2009).
278 Timothy Peter Ansberry, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 29 GEORGETOWN L. J. 614,
621 (1941).
279 See FINK, supra note 248, at 56.
280 The Prudent Man, TIME (June 1, 1959), http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article
/0,33009,811169,00.html.
281 FINK, supra note 248, at 58.
282 Id. at 50.
283 See Paula Dwyer et al., Breach of Trust: The Mutual-Fund Scandal Was a Disaster Waiting to
Happen, BUS. WEEK (Dec. 15, 2003), at 98, available at http://www.businessweek.com
/magazine/content/03_50/b3862015.htm?chan=search.
284 See Mutual Funds Integrity and Fee Transparency Act, H.R. 2420, 108th Cong. (2003).
277
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investors from otherwise invisible fees. It died amid fierce industry
opposition.285 The SEC has also tried to require that funds disclose fees
directly to investors, but it too failed in the face of ICI resistance.286
Mutual funds were also notably absent from the two most impactful
financial reforms of the 21st century—the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Dodd-Frank Act. One of the most important parts of Sarbanes-Oxley
imposed an internal-controls mandate on public companies;287 asset
managers fought the requirements off.288 One of the most important parts
of Dodd-Frank increased oversight over systemically important financial
institutions.289 Despite their trillions of dollars in holdings, large asset
managers won an exemption after extensive lobbying.290 The close call led
the industry to further increase its lobbying efforts after 2008.291
Despite their winning record, asset managers have not always
succeeded. One of their key failures is the reason they are currently under
scrutiny. Despite heavy lobbying, they failed to stop the SEC from requiring
disclosure of their proxy votes.292 For the most part, however, the ICI gets
its way. According to one SEC employee, “Sometimes it seems the SEC and
the ICI work so closely together that they forget where one’s job begins and
the other’s ends.”293
The political success of the asset-management industry stems not
only from its lobbying efforts, but also from its carefully crafted image. The
image-consciousness of the industry is well-known. According to
BusinessWeek, “For decades, mutual funds were left alone because they
convinced enough people that they were squeaky clean and had
shareholders' interests at heart.”294
See Neil Wienberg & Emily Lambert, Your Money at Work Against You, FORBES (Sept. 15,
2003), at 78.
286 See Dwyer et al., supra note 283.
287 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 789 (2002).
288 See Dwyer et al., supra note 283.
289 Dodd-Frank Pub L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1387 § 111 (establishing the Federal Stability
Oversight Council (“FSOC”); Steele, supra note 226 (describing FSOC’s role).
290 See Egan, supra note 234; Steele, supra note 226. The issue is still alive. See David Goldman,
Elizabeth Warren Grills Janet Yellen: Why isn’t BlackRock ‘Too Big to Fail?’ CNN (March 24,
2021), https://edition.cnn.com/2021/03/24/investing/elizabeth-warren-janet-yellen-blac
krock/index.html.
291 See Goshen & Levit, supra note 25, at 49-50.
292 See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Roberta Romano, Institutional Investors and Proxy Voting on
Compensation Plans: The Impact of the 2003 Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure Rule, 13 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 220, 221-22 (2011) (describing “considerable industry resistance” to the votingdisclosure rules); Dwyer et al., supra note 283 (describing “fierce” industry opposition to the
rules).
293 Dwyer et al., supra note 283.
294 Id.
285
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d. BlackRock’s Deep Political Ties
BlackRock, the industry leader with $9.5 trillion in assets under
management, is a special case.295 It hires from, and places people with, the
highest levels of government. It is also deeply involved in government
affairs296 and lobbies extensively.297 BlackRock efforts are self-serving, but
they undoubtedly generate positive externalities for other industry members,
particularly the other members of the Big 3.
The revolving door between BlackRock and the federal government
in recent years is startling. Three prominent members of the Biden
administration were high-ranking employees at BlackRock: Mike Pyle is
chief economic adviser for Vice President Kamala Harris (formerly
BlackRock’s chief investment strategist and before that, a member of
President Barack Obama’s economic staff); Brian Deese is the head of the
National Economic Council (formerly global head of sustainable investing
at BlackRock and a senior advisor to President Obama);298 and Adewale
Adeyemo is deputy treasury secretary (formerly senior advisor at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies at Blackrock and president of the
Obama Fund).299 Though BlackRock’s ties tilt liberal, it also supplied a senior
Treasury Department official to the Trump administration.300
BlackRock also hires people from similarly lofty government ranks.
The head of BlackRock’s research arm, Thomas Donilon, was President
Obama’s national security advisor.301 BlackRock recently hired Dalia Blass
Saqib Iqbal Ahmed & Sohini Podder, BlackRock Profit Beats as Assets Grow to a Record $9.5
Trillion, REUTERS (July 15, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/business/blackrock-quarterlyprofit-jumps-28-2021-07-14/.
296 See, e.g., Jenna Smialek, Top U.S. Officials Consulted with BlackRock as Markets Melted Down,
N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/24/business/economy/
fed-blackrock-pandemic-crisis.html.
297 See Yeganeh Torbati, Two Biden Aides Will Recuse on BlackRock Issues as Past Ties Pose
Questions, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/
01/02/blackrock-biden/ (“’There are some companies or trade associations who will wait
until a particular issue gathers momentum before intervening, but BlackRock seems pretty
determined to quash anything,’” one former Democratic congressional aide said. ‘They
don’t miss anything, and they intervene early and often.’”).
298 See Rebecca Ungarino, Here are 9 Fascinating Facts to Know about BlackRock, the World’s
Largest Asset Manager, INSIDER (June 10, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-toknow-about-blackrock-larry-fink-biden-cabinet-facts-2020-12.
299 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Wally Adeyemo, https://home.treasury.gov/about/generalinformation/officials/Wally-Adeyemo (last visited Dec. 5, 2021).
300 See Ryan Tracy, Meet Craig Phillips the Man in Charge of Trump’s Review of Wall Street Rules,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/meet-craig-phillips-the-manin-charge-of-trumps-review-of-wall-street-rules-1493026201.
301 See Ungarino, supra note 298.
295
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from the SEC’s investment management division (the group that regulates
asset managers) to oversee groups related to sustainability and stakeholder
capitalism.302 Coryann Stefansson, formerly at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, worked in BlackRock’s financial markets advisory unit from
2016 – 2019.303
Finally, Larry Fink is talked about as a potential treasury secretary,304
and he and BlackRock are routinely consulted on the most important
matters of economic policy. Most recently, former Federal Reserve
Chairman Mnuchin called Mr. Fink 5 times over one weekend to consult on
the government’s response to the COVID pandemic.305 Because of all this,
BlackRock has been referred to as the “fourth branch of government.”306
***
Stewardship offers large asset managers the opportunity to enhance
their political standing without compromising profits. The political history
of the asset-management industry suggests that this is an opportunity it
would eagerly embrace. The industry has long cultivated its relationship with
regulators. It pushed for and drafted the foundational mutual-fund
regulations, and it has had close ties with regulators ever since. Over the
years, the industry’s lobbying activities and carefully constructed image have
allowed it to avoid major reforms and earned it a reputation as a savvy
political actor. Its history of politically minded action makes it more likely
that the industry will view stewardship in this light.
B. Review of the Empirical Evidence of Asset-Management Voting
The empirical evidence discussed above did not align with the theory
that asset managers use their voting power to increase the value of portfolio
firms. The evidence does, however, largely line up with the theory that they
use it to serve political interests.
How asset managers historically approached voting shows that they
had little interest in stewardship until their apathy attracted regulatory
Id.
Id.
304 Ed., Larry Fink’s Political Purgatory, WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/larry-finks-political-purgatory-11590189627?cx_testId=3&cx_testVariant=cx_4
&cx_artPos=1&mod=WTRN#cxrecs_.
305 See Smialek, supra note 296.
306 Annie Massa & Caleb Melby, In Fink We Trust: BlackRock is Now ‘Fourth Branch of
Government,’ BLOOMBERG (May 5, 2021) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2020-05-21/how-larry-fink-s-blackrock-is-helping-the-fed-with-bond-buying
(quoting
Professor Birdthisle).
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attention. The industry’s early response was to outsource voting to proxy
advisory firms.307 As scrutiny of this practice built, they formed modest inhouse stewardship departments.308 Interest that escalates at the same rate as
regulatory pressure suggests that any enthusiasm is feigned. Rather than
generate profits, the increasing engagement seems designed to demonstrate
legal compliance and blunt the case for future reforms.
The substance of asset-manager stewardship—that is, what they
vote for and against—also looks politically motivated. After the SEC
mandated disclosure of their votes and explicitly tied fiduciary duties to
voting, funds began to back proposals increasing shareholder power at their
portfolio firms; then, in 2021, they began to support environmental and
social proposals.309
Supporting measures that empower shareholders is ever popular
with regulators.310 Congress and the SEC have imposed rules that require
independent audit committees311 and give shareholders a “say on pay.”312
The SEC also recently proposed rules that would require companies to use
a “universal ballot,” which would make it easier for shareholders to elect
insurgent directors.313 In addition, the SEC’s motivation for requiring public
disclosure of fund proxy votes was to improve shareholder oversight of
public companies.314 The SEC is therefore thrilled when asset managers
further its efforts by voting for measures that give shareholders more
influence.
The principles-based approach to corporate governance that asset
managers follow also implies a political motivation. As discussed above, they
vote for things like de-staggering boards across all firms in their portfolios.
While this approach does nothing to improve returns, it allows the large asset
managers to demonstrate their support for shareholder power much better
than through a case-by-case approach.
Similarly, it has long been puzzling why the large asset managers
frequently back hedge-fund activists despite significant questions about their
See Cotter, supra note 160, at 55.
See BIOY ET AL., supra note 150, at 19.
309 See supra Part II.C.2.
310 See, e.g., Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exchange Comm., Keynote Address at the
International Corporate Governance Network Annual Conference: Focusing the Lens of
Disclosure to Set the Path Forward on Board Diversity (Jun. 27, 2016), https://www.sec.
gov/news/speech/chair-white-icgn-speech.html (referring to measures such as destaggered boards as “success stories”).
311 See 15 U.S.C. 78j-1(m)(1) (2020).
312 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21 (2020).
313 See generally Universal Proxy, 86 Fed. Reg. 68330 (Dec. 1, 2021).
314 See Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered
Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6566 (Feb. 7, 2003).
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contribution to long-term value. They may do so to demonstrate ideological
alignment with the SEC. Though the agency has generally been quiet on the
matter, activism is consistent with the agency’s skeptical view of
management. The SEC also proposed a rule in 2020, which was dropped
amid wide opposition, that would have greatly aided activism.315 This more
than anything else signals that it views the practice positively.
The sudden support for environmental and social matters looks the
most political of all. After consistently voting down ES proposals, the large
asset managers pivoted to supporting such measures in the same year the
U.S. presidency switched parties from the Trump to the Biden
administration. The former was hostile to such proposals. Most notably, the
Department of Labor (the “DOL”) during Trump’s administration adopted
rules that forbid consideration of ES issues when companies select
investment alternatives for 401(k) participants,316 and forbid companies from
considering such issues when exercising voting authority over 401(k)
assets.317 The SEC also enacted rules that made it more difficult to make ES
proposals,318 and issued guidance making it easier for companies to challenge
them.319
The Biden administration is just the opposite. Environmental and
social issues are central to its agenda, and agency actions reflect that. The
See Reporting Threshold for Institutional Investment Managers, 85 Fed. Reg. 46016 (July
31, 2020); Ortenca Aliaj, SEC Disclosure Change Would Allow Activists to ‘Go Dark’, Lawyers
Warn, FIN. TIMES (July 23, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/1968c32d-5ac0-4502-8af87d45ec39791a; Alicia McElhaney, Why the SEC May Have Scrapped Its Controversial 13F
Proposal, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Oct 30, 2020), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/
article/b1p176msszqf3p/Why-the-SEC-May-Have-Scrapped-Its-Controversial-13FProposal.
316 See Employee Benefits Security Administration, Financial Factors in Selecting Plan
Investments, 88 Fed. Reg. 72846, 72864 (Nov. 13, 2020).
317 See generally Employee Benefits Security Administration, Fiduciary Duties Regarding
Proxy Voting and Shareholder Rights, 85 Fed. Reg. 81658 (Dec. 16, 2020).
318 The rules did not single out ES proposals, but because they increased the ownership
requirements for making proposals, they have a disproportionate impact on the smaller
shareholders that typically raise these issues. See generally Procedural Requirements and
Resubmission Thresholds under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, 85 Fed. Reg. 70240 (Nov. 4,
2020); Douglas MacMillan, Small Investors Have Pushed Big Companies Toward Social Change. A
New Rule Will Limit Their Influence, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.washington
post.com/business/2020/09/25/sec-shareholder-rule/.
319 See Sec. & Exch. Comm., Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14I, SEC Div. of Corp. Fin. (Nov. 1
2017), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/staff-legal-bulletin-14i-shareholder-proposals; Sec. &
Exch. Comm., Shareholder Proposals: Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14J, SEC Div. of Corp. Fin.
(Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/staff-legal-bulletin-14j-shareholderproposals; Sec. & Exch. Comm., Shareholder Proposals: Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14K, SEC
Div. of Corp. Fin. (Oct. 26, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/staff-legal-bulletin-14kshareholder-proposals.
315
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DOL indicated that it will not enforce the aforementioned Trump-era
rules,320 and the SEC has reversed its Trump-era guidance and eased the path
for shareholder proposals.321 The SEC has also prioritized rulemaking that
would require sustainability reporting,322 set up an enforcement task force
focused on climate and ESG issues,323 created a new position, Senior Policy
Advisor for Climate and ESG,324 and approved a Nasdaq rule requiring that
companies either have at least two board members of diverse backgrounds
or explain why they do not.325
The abrupt shift in the large asset managers’ voting parallels the
abrupt shift in government policy. Politics is the only plausible explanation.
Environmental and social issues are fundamental to the Biden
administration and to the current SEC. That being the case, continuing to
thwart ES proposals would have carried extreme political risk.326
***
Both theory and evidence suggest that the large asset managers use
their voting power to advance political goals rather than to improve fund
returns. Trying to make their holdings more valuable through the
shareholder franchise is unlikely to yield any benefits, but voting in a way
that aligns with the views of regulators and powerful politicians makes it less
See Statement Regarding Enforcement of Final Rules on ESG Investments and Proxy
Voting by Employee Benefit Plans (Mar. 10, 2021) https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/
files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/laws/erisa/statement-on-enforcement-of-final-rules-onesg-investments-and-proxy-voting.pdf; Ross Kerber, Investors Sue U.S. Regulator over Trumpera AGM Resolution Rules, REUTERS (June 15, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/
investors-sue-us-regulator-over-trump-era-agm-resolution-rules-2021-06-15/.
321 See Sec. & Exch. Comm., Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14L, SEC Div. of Corp. Fin. (Nov. 3,
2021)
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/staff-legal-bulletin-14l-shareholder-proposals;
Katanga Johnson & Ross Kerber, Top U.S. Financial Regulator Reverses Stance on Social Issues,
REUTERS (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/business/us-sec-staff-outlines-howcompanies-might-exclude-shareholder-proposal-corporate-2021-11-03/.
322 See Dave Michaels, SEC Wants More Climate Disclosures. Businesses are Preparing for a Fight,
WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/climate-fight-brews-as-secmoves-toward-mandate-for-risk-disclosure-11624267803?mod=article_inline.
323 SEC Announces Enforcement Task Force Focused on Climate and ESG Issues,
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-42 (March 4, 2021).
324 Satyam Khanna Named Senior Policy Advisor for Climate and ESG (Feb 1, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-20.
325 See Nasdaq Diversity-Rule Approval, 86 Fed. Reg. at 44425.
326 The voting reversal caused a backlash from Congressional Republicans. See Lim, supra
note 222. But this response was inevitable. Corporate governance has become political, and
in politics one must choose a side. Those whom the asset managers crossed may gain power
in future years. But asset managers vote annually, so they can adjust their positions if it
becomes necessary.
320
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likely that the unprecedented power of the large asset managers becomes a
regulatory target.
C. Other Influences on Asset-Manager Voting
Politics is the only tenable explanation for the sudden support for
environmental and social issues. It also aligns with the asset managers’
support for hedge-fund activism and for shareholder friendly governance
proposals. But it is overly reductionist to suggest that nothing else influences
how asset managers vote.
There are a couple of potential counterweights. If an activist
campaign or shareholder proposal would clearly and materially harm one of
an asset manager’s portfolio companies, they are likely to vote against it even
if the result is politically disadvantageous. The ultimate vote would be the
outcome of weighing the political risk against the risk of damaging the firm
they own. Further, asset managers likely have some concern about the views
of their mutual-fund investors. Because investors might leave, asset
managers are unlikely to vote in a way that alienates a significant proportion
of them. As above, their final vote would depend on weighing the risk of
losing investors against the political impact. Because few investors likely pay
close attention to voting records, however, investor sentiment is likely a
small counterweight to politics.
Others have pointed to the role of ideology, culture, and marketing
in asset-manager voting. While these considerations likely color their
decisions, none appear to be key drivers.
Ideology and Culture. As noted above, Congressional Republicans have
recently suggested that the personal views and values of the CEOs of the
large asset managers are driving stewardship decisions.327 Professors Bubb
and Catan similarly argue that different asset managers have different
governance philosophies and that this explains how they vote.328 One could
combine and expand these views into a theory that leadership ideology and
firm culture, in particular the culture of their stewardship departments,
influence asset-manager voting.
There is probably some truth to this. Leaders likely have different
views on the issues that come before their firms. Some may view hedge-fund
activists with skepticism; others may cheer them. The same goes for
environmental and social issues. For instance, Larry Fink was likely eager to
support ES measures, but BlackRock pragmatically voted against them until
it was politically expedient. Leadership ideology also may seep into the firm’s
327
328

See id.
See Bubb & Catan, supra note 79, at 24.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4069347

53

STEWARDSHIP THEATER

2022
DRAFT

culture with respect to stewardship and the values it reflects through its
voting.
This theory, however, is limited. It does not explain the sudden shift
to supporting environmental and social matters. CEOs did not change at the
same time as the U.S. presidency. Asset-management cultures did not
suddenly evolve. This theory also does not explain the relative homogeneity
in voting across the large asset managers and the asset-management
industry.329 While varied leadership and culture likely play some role, the
voting story is more one of similarity than spread.
Marketing. Marketing also likely influences voting. All asset managers
would rather be viewed as good stewards than as laggards. Perhaps this is
why they prepare stewardship reports, which have the feel of promotional
materials.330 Stewardship may be a show not only for regulators, but also for
the investing public.
Like ideology and culture, however, marketing also probably plays a
peripheral role. It seems improbable that a material number of investors
allocate their money based on their perception of which asset manager is the
most diligent participant in corporate governance. It is also unlikely many
investors download the stewardship glossies, let alone make investing
decisions based on them. Though nominally for investors, these materials
are probably aimed at regulators and social activists.
Another possibility is that because ESG funds are a growth area,
large asset managers are using their votes to market to investors concerned
about such issues.331 Again, though, marketing is likely a secondary rationale.
Marketing cannot explain why the large asset managers voted against ES

See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., BLACKROCK, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP ANNUAL REPORT (2020),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-annual-stewardshipreport-2020.pdf.
331 See Dawn Lim, Wall Street Lobbies to Bring More ESG Funds into 401(k)s, WALL ST. J. (Mar.
3, 2021) https://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-street-lobbies-to-bring-more-esg-funds-into401-k-s-11614767400 (showing growth of ESG funds). An influential article argues that the
Big 3 are thought leaders on ES issues to market to Millennial investors. See Michal Barzuza
et al., Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism, 93 U.S.C. L. REV. 1243, 1248-49 (2020).
The argument does not match Vanguard’s and BlackRock’s long history of voting against
such issues. See supra Part II.D.2.c. Millennials are also a small part of the investor pool, and
while their share will inevitably grow, it will happen slowly as they accumulate assets through
small payroll deductions that feed their 401(k) accounts. See Characteristics of Mutual Fund
Investors 2020, at 18 fig 18, INV. CO. INST. (Nov. 2020), https://www.ici.org/system
/files/attachments/pdf/per26-09.pdf. (showing Millennials owing 16% of mutual-fund
assets); Rydqvist et al., supra note 10, at 2 (noting that “retirement wealth is built through
payroll deductions”).
329
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proposals for so long.332 ESG funds did not spring up in 2021. And before
then, the frequency with which ESG funds voted against ES proposals drew
significant criticism.333
Finally, voting all of the asset manager’s shares for ES proposals—
as they have begun to do—is not the best way to target socially conscious
investors. A sizable share of an asset manager’s potential investors likely
comes out differently on such matters.334 Rather than risk alienating them,
asset managers could vote the shares of its ESG funds separately. Failure to
divide voting in this simple manner suggests that marketing is not their
primary motivation.335
***
The actions of a single person, let alone an institution with layers of
management and rife with competing interests, cannot be understood solely
through reference to one factor. Accordingly, culture, ideology, and
marketing likely come into play as large asset managers decide how to vote.
None, however, appear nearly as important as politics.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The fundamental claim outlined above is that politics rather than
profits—or any other consideration—principally drives voting at the large
See Jacki Cook & Jon Hale, Sustainable Fund Proxy Votes Show a Range of Support for ESG
Measures 5, MORNINGSTAR (Dec. 2020) (“Vanguard’s and BlackRock’s ESG funds voted
for fewer than 20% of key ESG proposals”), 8-9 (“[A]cross their funds, BlackRock and
Vanguard rank amongst the least supportive of ESG key resolutions.”); Jon Hale, All
Sustainable Funds are Not the Same When it Comes to Proxy Voting, THE ESG ADVISOR (Dec.
18, 2020), https://medium.com/the-esg-advisor/all-sustainable-funds-are-not-the-samewhen-it-comes-to-proxy-voting-c1ae39f6e040; Betsy Verecky ESG Funds Often Fail to Vote
their Values, Research Shows, MIT MANAGEMENT SLOAN SCHOOL (June 21, 2021),
https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/esg-funds-often-fail-to-vote-their-valuesresearch-shows (“the Vanguard Social Index Fund voted against almost all environmental
and social resolutions over the time examined”).
333 See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 29; Schatz, supra note 180.
334 See Ed., Larry Fink’s Political Purgatory, WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/larry-finks-political-purgatory (“A resolution … that asked
BlackRock’s Board to prepare a report on how to implement a stakeholder corporate
purpose drew only 3.85% shareholder support.”); Fisch, supra note 37, at 17 n. 115.
335 See Cook & Hale, supra note 332, at 8-9 (“BlackRock and Vanguard’s ‘house’ view on
ESG proxy votes is almost exactly replicated across their largest ESG funds.”); But see Quinn
Curtis et al., Do ESG Mutual Funds Deliver on Their Promises 42-43 (ECGI Working Paper No
586/2021, 20210) (finding that ESG funds vote against management more often than nonESG funds).
332
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asset managers. This understanding of asset-manager behavior has
implications for social welfare, policy, and theory.
A. Social-Welfare Implications
It is worth first considering whether politically driven voting is
concerning. Large asset managers are engaged in corporate governance like
never before and have supported ESG proposals and hedge-fund activists.
Backing these efforts has changed the shape of corporate America. If all of
this is for political reasons, those in support of this voting record might
welcome the role of politics. If asset managers are engaged and supporting
the right things, what does it matter if they are doing so for the right reasons?
But this perspective misses a great deal of nuance. The political
aspect of asset-manager stewardship has two dimensions. The first is
procedural. Asset managers seek to demonstrate that they are sufficiently
diligent when exercising their voting rights. That is why they are growing
their internal stewardship teams and tout their engagements. The other is
substantive. Asset managers seek to show ideological alignment with
regulators and politicians through the proposals and activists they support.
The substantive aspect is more worrisome, but both are problematic.
First, consider the procedural component. In a sense, asset managers
have invented and are complying with their own quasi-regulatory standard
of care for stewardship decisions—a standard they consider high enough to
keep regulators at bay. One problem is that the performance may work and
thereby ward off more costly, but more effective, regulations. The
performance may also be wasteful. Regulations aimed at improving
stewardship are an indirect effort to improve the performance of public
companies. The hope is that a regulatory push will cause asset managers to
scrutinize the corporate executives of the companies they own. If, as this
Article argues, funds are not doing this, then stewardship expenditures are
an inefficient use of resources.
It is one thing to feign diligence; it is another to determine what to
support based on reading political tea leaves. One issue with letting politics
guide substance is that the things asset managers end up supporting,
although politically advantageous, may not actually be in the best interests
of their portfolio companies. As noted above, asset managers generally
support measures that shift the locus of power from management and the
board to the shareholders.336 Yet it is not always appropriate to shift this
balance. It may impede management and lead to short-termism. Nor are
environmental and social proposals good for all companies. Nevertheless,
336

See Goshen & Levit, supra note 25, at 5.
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asset managers apply one-size-fits-all principles to these questions. This
voting pattern likely helps the performance of some companies but hurts
others.
The social-welfare implications of these votes are also ambiguous.
Advancing the power of shareholders comes at the expense of other
stakeholders.337 Environmental proposals may result in greenwashing, social
proposals in “social washing.”338 Also, as above, the private ordering
approach to regulatory issues may supplant effective regulation.
In addition to ESG proposals, asset managers frequently support
hedge-fund activists. Supporting activists shows an interest in holding
management accountable, which appeals to the SEC. Like increased
shareholder power, though, activism is not necessarily good for portfolio
firms or society. While activism often improves short-term returns, much of
the gains come at the expense of long-term investors and other
stakeholders.339 There is also little assurance that funds are picking the right
activists to support,340 particularly if their decision-making is driven by
political considerations.
More important than asset managers’ voting records is what
politically motivated stewardship portends. Even those who applaud the
short-term results—shareholder empowerment, hedge-fund activism, more
environmental and social transparency—should worry about the long-term.
Since voting follows politics, and politics is constantly changing, in the long
run, voting is likely to be capricious. Asset managers can be expected to flip
flop on issues as the political calculation changes. This is particularly true
because of how political shareholder proposals and activism have become.
Each year, asset managers will likely face great pressure to align their voting
with the politics of the governing party. The sudden support of
environmental and social issues that manifested as the federal government
changed parties is likely only the first instance of political whipsawing.
Uncertainty as to how their key shareholders will vote from year to
year makes managing public companies more difficult. Generally,
uncertainty in business is associated with reduced wages, investment, and
production, as well as higher risk premiums.341 Unpredictable stewardship
See id. at 17.
Etica Funds, Social Washing: What is It and Why Could COVID-19 Be Making It
Worse?, https://www.eticasgr.com/en/storie/insights/social-washing (last visited Jul. 3,
2021).
339 See deHaan et al., supra note 117, at 8-13.
340 See Goshen & Levit, supra note 25, at 772 (“[A]ctivist hedge funds sometimes mistakenly
target firms whose managers are in fact effective activist”).
341 See How Does Uncertainty Impact Economic Activity? PWC GLOBAL ECONOMY WATCH (June
2017), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/news-room/docs/how-does-uncertainty-impacteconomic-activity.pdf.
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poses all of these risks, particularly with the increasing politicization of
corporate governance. In years where progressive policies are more
politically advantageous, corporate managers will be pushed to be more
stakeholder friendly; in other years, they will be pushed to abandon such
efforts and maximize shareholder value. Without a clear and stable mission,
managers will be forced to be more cautious and middling, afraid to take on
big projects lest they need the resources for a strategy shift.
Politically driven stewardship also hints of state capitalism—where
the state runs the economy. If large asset managers are voting to please
regulators and politicians, then regulators and politicians indirectly control
these votes. This gives government officials an extraordinary say over the
operations of public companies, which threatens the sacred, and somewhat
imprecise, line between government and business.
Government rules typically provide transparency or set boundaries
on firm operations. In the securities area, the rules are primarily designed to
protect investors and primarily do so by mandating disclosures,342 a soft
form of intervention. Corporate law is similar in that fiduciary duties protect
against mismanagement and self-dealing, but corporate codes do not dictate
what companies do.343
When government influence over asset-manager voting gives it
shareholder-like power, it takes on a far more substantial role. If the major
asset managers voted to oust Exxon’s board for political reasons, then
politicians are indirectly charting Exxon’s course. And this is problematic.
There are questions about motivations and competence.344
Politicians may push asset managers to favor policies for political reasons
rather than financial ones. For instance, congresspersons may encourage
asset managers to vote against hedge-fund activist challenges at companies
that are important financial backers or headquartered in their districts.
Politicians might also look to asset managers to further their policy agenda.
For instance, they may lean on asset managers to vote against environmental
shareholder proposals because their party resists climate activism. Finally,
politicians are not financial professionals. Even if they use their power to
push asset managers to vote for policies that they think are in portfolio
companies’ best interest, there is little reason to think they are right.

See Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility, and Market Risk 89 OR. L. REV. 175, 181 (2010).
See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (1984) (describing the deferential standard used
to review business decisions).
344 See Holland, supra note 33, at 321 (“[G]overnments are motivated by two sets of
objectives: economic objectives, such as maximizing investors’ welfare, and noneconomic
objectives, such as maximizing political benefits. Noneconomic objectives are likely to
reduce profitability…”).
342
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The overlap with politics is also problematic from a legitimacy
perspective. Asset managers are only financial intermediaries. They vote on
behalf of the shareholders in the funds they oversee. As such, they owe a
fiduciary duty to vote in fund shareholders’ best interests. Instead, the large
asset managers are voting to serve their own political interests. Not only is
this a violation of their fiduciary duty, it is also an illegitimate use of the
power entrusted to them, which harms the very people asset managers are
supposed to serve. Politically driven voting compromises the long-term
value of the companies in which fund shareholders are invested and, if
successful, forestalls regulations intended to help them.
This analysis casts the relationship of financial institutions,
government, and public companies in a new light. The concentration of
ownership and control in the hands of financial institutions typically triggers
concerns about self-dealing and conflicts of interest.345 But in this case, the
key concern with financial influence is that it hands too much control to
government. Another common concern is that business has too much say
over politics.346 This Article argues the opposite.
B. Policy Implications
Because of the downsides of politically motivated voting, the policy
response is to reduce its role in asset-manager stewardship. There are two
conceptual approaches for doing so. One is to alter the incentive calculation
of asset managers so that politics is no longer their paramount concern. The
other is to tie the discretion of asset managers to the wishes of mutual-fund
shareholders. I recommend the latter.
Altering asset-manager incentives is difficult. Politics plays such an
important role because the financial incentives for stewardship are so
meager. If engagement was profitable, however, politics would shrink in
relative importance. As noted above, regulations are largely responsible for
stripping asset managers of the financial incentive to participate in corporate
governance.347 Concentrated holdings motivate careful voting, but the rules
prohibit mutual funds from allocating more than 5% of their portfolio to
any company or holding more than 10% of a company’s stock.348 These rules
could be rescinded.
This change, however, would likely do little to solve the problem. It
would theoretically allow asset managers to operate hedge-fund like
See Roe, supra note 112, at 1502.
See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 196, at 8 (expressing concern over corporate
political influence).
347 See supra Part III.A.2.
348 See 26 U.S.C. § 851 (2020).
345
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instruments with concentrated positions in certain firms.349 While this would
give asset managers a large financial incentive to carefully vote their shares
in these firms, it would do nothing for the hundreds of other companies
with respect to which asset managers vote. Politics would thus still drive
voting in the vast majority of cases.
The better way to eliminate politics from stewardship is to constrain
the voting authority of asset managers. While asset managers today are
technically supposed to vote in the “best interests” of mutual-fund
shareholders, practically speaking they have complete discretion. Instead,
asset managers should be required to vote based on input from mutual-fund
investors. As a result, they would no longer be able to use voting to further
their political interests.
There are several ways to give investors input. The purest form
would be pass-through voting, where investors would instruct asset
managers how they would like their votes cast with respect to each matter.
But pure pass-through voting would be overkill. It would eliminate the
politics problem, but retail investors would be rationally apathetic about
voting.350 As a result, few votes would actually be cast.
A middle ground would be to require that asset managers poll fund
investors about preferences with respect to voting principles and that asset
managers reflect these preferences in their voting across the investors’
portfolios.351 For instance, investors could be asked about whether they
support diversity efforts and climate transparency efforts at portfolio firms.
The asset manager would then be required to proportionally reflect investor
preferences at each company where activism or shareholder proposals
implicating these issues arise.
Many investors would likely fail to respond to this outreach, but
since the costs of participation are far lower, more would participate in
governance this way than with pure pass-through voting. A question arises
as to what to do with the votes for those investors who do not respond. If
asset managers were permitted to vote these shares in their discretion, then
they would retain a great deal of power to use voting for political ends. That

See Morley, supra note 121, at 1412 (discussing hurdles to the Big 3 operating activist
hedge funds).
350 See Schwartz, supra note 277, at 558. Pass-through voting might be a viable option for
institutional clients, however. BlackRock, in fact, will provide its largest institutional clients
with such voting rights beginning in 2022. See Dawn Lim, BlackRock Gives Big Investors Ability
to Vote on Shareholder Proposals, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
blackrock-gives-big-investors-ability-to-vote-on-shareholder-proposals-11633617321.
351 Professors Griffin and Hirst have also proposed increased input for mutual-fund
shareholders. See Griffin, supra note 228 at 992-94; Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions,
43 J. CORP. L. 217, 238 (2018).
349
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being the case, if investors do not respond, asset managers should be
required to abstain.
This approach not only sidelines politics, it also makes proxy voting
fairer and is a better match to fiduciary duties. As the economic owners (even
if not the certificate holders) of portfolio firms, it seems axiomatic that
mutual-fund investors should have a say over how their stakes are voted.
This is especially the case today, where to an ever-increasing degree,
corporate-governance issues are political and controversial. Financial
intermediaries seem particularly unsuited to decide these matters.
Asking for investor input also aligns with the asset managers’
fiduciary duties. Asset managers today make no effort to gauge whether their
votes are in the “best interests” of fund shareholders. This is defensible
assuming that asset managers vote to increase the value of portfolio firms.
Voting in this manner is plausibly in the best interests of shareholders and
likely explains why asset managers always defend votes for ES matters on
shareholder-value grounds.352 Appeals to shareholder value ring hollow,
however, when the issues and votes are political. For these matters, some
effort to understand investor preferences seems appropriate—if not,
necessary—to meet the “best interest” standard.
Finally, while this proposal does require some investment, the costs
are not large and should be offset by related savings. Asset managers would
have to design their questionnaires, reach out to investors, tally results, and
reflect those results in their voting.353 While all of this requires time and
resources, this approach is likely cheaper than the stewardship theater funds
engage in today. It is also a far more justifiable expense in that it is incurred
to empower investors rather than serve the asset managers’ political
interests.
***
A common defense of the status quo is that, while asset managers may
not be perfect, leaving power with them is better than handing the reins to
retail investors.354 This claim is unpersuasive.
First, let us not idealize what is being given up. Empowering
individuals does not replace sophisticated stewardship with apathy; it
replaces politically minded stewardship with good-faith stewardship.

See Barzuza, supra note 331at 1276; Lim, supra note 222.
Nuanced issues arise about how best to engage shareholders and reflect their varied
preferences across the wide range of topics involved. I plan to address these issues in future
work.
354 See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1814.
352
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Moreover, individual investors are better situated to participate in
corporate governance than at any time before. Environmental and social
proposals were the two most common in 2021, up 37% and 13% over
2020.355 These forms of intervention, which aim to improve social welfare
rather than merely firm welfare, appear to be the future of corporate
governance. And it is with respect to these issues where voting by individual
shareholders makes the most sense. These votes are based on values rather
than financial sophistication. Individuals can represent their values just as
easily as institutions. Further, the collective-action problem that so troubled
Berle and Means is not nearly as problematic when it comes to value-driven
voting. While there is a disincentive to engage in corporate governance when
financial gains are shared, people are unlikely to be concerned about
spreading their values. Given the shift to values-based stewardship, the usual
concerns about retail-investor voting are not as salient.
Finally, the change recommended here is not as abrupt as it first
appears. Individuals are not the only ones who invest in mutual funds. Fiftyseven percent of the money BlackRock manages, for instance, belongs to
institutional investors.356 Thus, while allowing mutual-fund investors to
participate in corporate governance does empower individuals, it also shifts
power to other institutions.
Similarly, while asset managers hold 30% of the stock market,357
other financial institutions hold an additional 50%.358 Thus, even if assetmanager influence is stymied, banks, pension plans, hedge funds, and other
sophisticated investors would still dominate corporate governance and the
public market. Instead of the large asset managers driving corporate
governance based on political concerns, control would be dispersed among
institutional investors and individuals. This mix of voices may not yield
perfect corporate governance, if such a thing exists, but it would be fairer to
mutual-fund shareholders and provide greater stability for corporate
managers. It would also lead to better results because hedge-fund activists
and advocates of shareholder proposals would have to convince a range of
voters with different views rather than a few large asset managers with
compromised incentives.

GIBSON DUNN, supra note 103, at 4-5.
BlackRock, Q2 2021 Earnings Exhibit 99.2 (July 14, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/0001364742/000156459021036497/blk-ex992_7.htm.
357 See INV. CO. INST., supra note 49, at i.
358 See Charles McGrath, 80% of Equity Market Cap Held by Institutions, PENSION &
INVESTMENTS (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.pionline.com/article/20170425/INTERAC
TIVE/170429926/80-of-equity-market-cap-held-by-institutions.
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C. Implications for Corporate-Governance Theory
A motivating question for much scholarship in this area is whether
the rise of large asset managers finally resolves the agency-cost problem at
the heart of the Berle-Means thesis. This Article shows that, instead of
sunsetting this concern, the rise of the Big 3 and others shows the
inadequacy of the Berle-Means approach. While agency costs are an
important part of the corporate-governance story, it is much more useful to
think more broadly about the motivations that guide large asset managers’
voting. Recognition of the political motivations behind their voting
uncovers a host of concerns about the relationship between business and
government that Berle-Means cannot envision. The policy prescription to
transfer voting discretion to individuals also runs counter to Berle-Means
and its concern about the collective-action problems of dispersed
ownership. The broader takeaway for corporate-governance theory is that
when analyzing core questions—like what is the optimal allocation of power
among shareholders and between the board and shareholders—
policymakers, judges, and scholars should focus on what motivates different
shareholders, and different types of shareholders, rather than on their
potential to police agency costs.
CONCLUSION
The Big 3 and other large asset managers have significant power over
corporate America, but how they use this power is little understood. The
extant literature has sought to understand asset-manager stewardship solely
in terms of their incentive to increase the value of portfolio firms. What this
perspective reveals is that the incentive for asset managers to use
stewardship as a tool to better the companies they own is weak. This insight
invites a hugely important and little acknowledged question: if funds have
little at stake financially, then what drives their engagement and voting?
I argue that politics drives voting at the large asset managers. While
stewardship offers little in the way of conventional profits, if used wisely, it
can hedge the significant political risk that large asset managers face because
of their tremendous success. Politics offers the only explanation for the Big
3’s sudden embrace of environmental and social issues. It also explains their
support for hedge-fund activism and shareholder-empowering proposals, as
well as the process by which they engage in stewardship.
Politically driven voting is problematic: it is an illegitimate use of the
voting power asset managers exercise on behalf of their investors; it makes
public companies harder to run; and it provides politicians with too much
say over industry. To remove politics from corporate governance, asset
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managers should be required to seek input from their investors and reflect
that input in their voting. So constrained, funds would no longer be able to
advance their own political agenda without regard to the interests of those
whose capital they manage.
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